By David Gendelman for Radio Liberty
Currently, the discussions focus on a ceasefire or a truce between Ukraine and Russia, not peace. A peace treaty implies the complete removal of mutual claims and full normalization of relations, which is still far off, considering the significant gap between the positions of both sides. As an example, after the War of Independence, Israel signed ceasefire agreements with neighboring countries in 1949, which were repeatedly violated, followed by several wars, and only in 1979 did Egypt become the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel.
In world history, there are examples for anything, but there are no perfect analogies. The option being discussed in negotiations with the US is closer to the Finnish model than to the Korean one: in Korea, no part of the country was annexed, although there was fighting on its territory, whereas Finland agreed to cede part of its territory and conduct foreign policy taking into account the interests of the USSR, which became known as “Finlandization.” Finnish industry focused on exporting to the USSR, and the Finnish army was armed with Soviet weapons, etc. In hindsight, Finns now consider the decision of that time to have been wise and reasonable, but many Ukrainians fear that this will not happen for them. They will sign all the restrictions, and Russia, after a few years of respite, will simply attack again. This is, of course, a problem, but this is roughly the option currently being discussed.
The Russian Armed Forces' operation in the Kursk region, with the passage through the pipeline, would not have brought any significant success if it were not just one element in the agreed complex of offensive actions. This is simply the same patent as a year ago in Avdiivka, but by itself, it does not resolve anything. Cutting off supply communications from the flanks, attacks north of Sudzha, with the pipeline being just another element, will result in a sharp reduction of the bridgehead and "maneuvering of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to more advantageous defensive positions," meaning retreat. Currently, fighting is already taking place in Sudzha itself, and about 200 sq. km of the bridgehead remains from the original 900 at its peak expansion, with the question now being about the complete withdrawal of forces. Following the tradition of Ukrainian command, it seems the withdrawal will happen at the last moment or even later, with losses and breakthroughs through the narrowing corridor.
Holding the Kursk bridgehead was declared by the Ukrainian leadership as a negotiating card to exchange for something else, but now the Russian Armed Forces are taking this card without any exchange. The operation was prepared in advance, but it is quite likely that its execution was timed with the negotiations to take the Ukrainian card directly off the table. And what is undoubtedly timed to the negotiations is the mass attack of Ukrainian UAVs on Moscow and other Russian regions. Trump constantly says “you don’t have any cards,” but this was an attempt to show the cards, it is a typical negotiation tactic.
On the Pokrovsk direction, we are seeing a slowdown in the Russian offensive, which shows that with the appropriate distribution of forces and defensive organization, it is possible to slow them down. It may also be possible in the Sumy region to organize in such a way as to prevent further Russian advancement when the Ukrainian Armed Forces fully or partially withdraw from the Kursk bridgehead. Whether this will work or not, whether there will be enough strength, we will see.
Even the European countries that declare their readiness to send their contingents mean the possible deployment of peacekeepers after a ceasefire. And since there is no ceasefire yet, there is nothing to talk about.
