The Counterintelligence of the Security Service of Ukraine carried out a multi-stage special operation in Odessa, resulting in the arrest of another agent from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (commonly known as GRU).
This agent was providing the aggressor with targets for air strikes on the city, tracking the locations and movements of Ukrainian air defense units, and reporting on the consequences of missile attacks and drone-kamikaze strikes.
According to the investigation, the culprit was a private lawyer who had previously been an assistant-adviser to several deputies from the "Shariy Party" faction in one of the district councils in the Odessa region.
After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, he and his wife moved to temporarily occupied Simferopol, where he voluntarily approached the "military commissariat of Crimea." There, the Odessa resident was recruited by Grigory Ivanov, a personnel officer from the 3rd operational unit of the 316th intelligence center of the Russian GRU. He worked undercover, posing as an FSB (Federal Security Service) agent.
He signed an agreement for clandestine cooperation in favor of Russia, after which the agent was given the operational codename "Diezel." He received an "advance" payment of 500 US dollars for conducting intelligence and subversive activities against Ukraine. Following this, he returned to Odessa to gather intelligence.
In Odessa, he also attempted to establish contacts with local law enforcement officers, studying their profiles for potential recruitment into the Russian intelligence network.
He maintained communication with the Russian military intelligence through an anonymous chat in a popular messenger, where he deleted all information after each communication session.
Later, to maintain cover, he joined one of the local civic organizations involved in maintaining public order in the city.
Based on the gathered evidence, the investigators of the Security Service of Ukraine informed him of the suspicion of committing treason under Article 111 (Part 2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (state treason committed during a state of war). Currently, he is in custody, and he could face life imprisonment for his actions.
There are also plans to notify his Russian handler about the suspicion of espionage. The counterintelligence agents of the Ukrainian special service identified operational links of the Russian spy, including five more GRU officers from his close circle.
Additionally, the SSU counterintelligence identified the traitor's wife, who currently resides in St. Petersburg and collaborates with the Russian GRU, receiving a monthly payment. She administers a Telegram channel that spreads fake information about the situation in Odessa upon orders from hostile intelligence services.
The issue of notifying her about the suspicion of state treason is being addressed.
The exposure operation was conducted by the SSU staff in the Odessa region under the procedural guidance of the Odesa Regional Prosecutor's Office.
