Russia is seeking to return to Georgia’s public sphere not through diplomacy but through culture—and it is doing so methodically. This is according to an analysis by the U.S.-based The Jamestown Foundation.
Diplomatic relations between the two countries have been severed since 2008, so Russia’s interests in Tbilisi are formally represented by the Swiss Embassy. Operating under this arrangement is the Russian “Interests Section,” whose head, D. Olisov, has said that promoting the Russian language is one of its main priorities.
The Kremlin’s toolkit is familiar: appeals to a “shared history,” cultural performances, and Russian-language programs. On May 14, students from a Russian performing arts university staged a concert featuring a Soviet-era repertoire at the Rustaveli Theatre in Tbilisi—an event that immediately drew criticism because of its prominent venue in the center of the Georgian capital. A month later, on June 14–15, Putin’s special representative for international cultural cooperation, Mikhail Shvydkoy, visited Tbilisi for the second time this year. Officially, the visit was linked to a theater tour, but unofficially it promoted the narrative of restoring trust between Moscow and Georgia through culture.
At the same time, Russia is attempting to portray the Russian language as part of Georgia’s cultural heritage. In late May, the Russian Interests Section gathered Georgian teachers of Russian, and on June 6 it organized an event marking the birthday of Alexander Pushkin, attended by only about two dozen elderly participants. The outcome was the opposite of what had been intended: Georgian activists viewed the event as an attempt to promote the “Russian World” ideology, while Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova responded by calling the protesters “radicals.”
The Kremlin is also targeting young people and the creative community through initiatives such as the Pushkin Competition, the “Ambassadors of the Russian Language” project, and invitations to children's and youth competitions held in Russia. At the same time, these activities are expanding beyond Tbilisi: performances by Russian artists are scheduled in Batumi during the summer and autumn, including some performers who have openly supported the war against Ukraine or justified the occupation of Georgian territories.
These efforts are unlikely to produce a rapid increase in pro-Russian sentiment. However, Moscow’s objective is different—not to secure mass public support, but to test how willing Georgian society is to tolerate Russia’s return to the public sphere under the guise of “apolitical” cultural activities. Even relatively small-scale initiatives can deepen polarization and provide the Kremlin with opportunities to claim that anti-Russian forces in Georgia are becoming increasingly “radicalized.”
