According to the "cautious" assessment of the combat capability of the Russian grouping concentrated and operating in the Sumy direction, it is capable of conducting a limited-scale offensive operation (10 km deep and up to 30 km along the front) with the aim of creating a buffer zone in the Sumy region of Ukraine of the corresponding length.
However, its ability to break through the PREPARED defenses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (even the first line/position) at this direction's operational-tactical depth, and especially to advance towards the city of Sumy, personally raises, at this moment, quite skeptical assessments from me.
In my opinion, theoretically, this is possible, but only after a radical (at least the size of a full-fledged army corps, or even a combined-arms army) STRENGTHENING of this Russian grouping. However, at the moment, it is clear that the Russian command does not have such a capability. It may appear no earlier than mid-summer. And even then, on the condition that the process of forming and deploying strategic reserves in the Russian Federation will not be significantly "complicated," and the scale and volume of offensive actions on other operational directions will remain minimal.
Therefore, let's consider the POSSIBLE aspirations of the Russian command in the Sumy direction exclusively in a tactical "bending" (well, with a light operational "touch").
So, according to the norms and standards of "thinking" of Russian operational-level commanders (who, in fact, formulate and set tasks for their "tactical" commanders in specific "tactical" terrain), the creation of some kind of buffer zone in our Sumy border region only makes sense if it allows occupying and holding blocking positions and lines that will prevent the sudden transition of the Ukrainian Armed Forces into an offensive aimed at eliminating this "buffer" on their territory.
What is needed for this?
Correct – to occupy dominant heights, use water obstacles, forested areas, and other natural features of the terrain to create and equip convenient tactical positions and lines. And most importantly – to gain the ability to "oversee" the nearest tactical rear of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and, accordingly, influence (primarily, with their firepower) it, in order to promptly establish and disrupt any movement, maneuver, or concentration of their forces and resources.
For this, control, in one form or another, over ALL communications in the area, column routes, and generally any sections of the terrain convenient for Russian troop movements is required. Primarily, this refers to the ability for FIRE control.
Based on everything said above, the key "objects on the terrain" for the Russian forces, in terms of the stability of their hypothetical "buffer zone," COULD BE 4 objects – the heights between Yunakivka and Khrapivshchyna, a significant forest area northeast of Sumy, stretching from Rad'kivka to Mohrytsia, and the Psel River. In other words, if the Russian command decides to "supply their elite a bit more" in clearly difficult and protracted offensive battles in the Ukrainian border area, the likelihood of actions by the Russians in the direction "from the border towards them" is quite high. In this case, they will try to do a few things, or just one of them, or maybe just a couple, in particular:
-
They will try to gain control over the Bilovody – Loknya – Yunakivka – Yablunivka area. Interestingly, they are ALREADY attempting to advance on Loknya and Yunakivka.
-
Occupy, at least, the eastern part of the aforementioned forest area west of Mohrytsia. The concentration of a marine infantry grouping on this direction is clearly not accidental.
-
Reach the line of Velyka Rybytsia – Myropillia, along the Psel River.
-
It is also quite possible that they will attempt to break through from the border to Vorozhba and Belopolye, aiming to cut off an important operational road that leads from Sumy to Novhorod-Siverskyi.
However, even all of this combined, in operational terms (i.e., with an eye on capturing Sumy), is unlikely to significantly COMPLICATE the Ukrainian Armed Forces' ability to organize and conduct defense in the Sumy direction. Perhaps, with the exception of point 4 (breakthrough to Vorozhba).
But its execution would clearly require significant "effort" from the Russian command, including the need to "somehow" secretly concentrate a strike tactical group of troops in the area of Tyotkino, which the Ukrainian Armed Forces are currently able to "break through and cover" from three sides simultaneously.
To summarize:
At the moment, the composition and size of the Kursk Russian grouping, and its combat capability, allow for tactical-scale offensive actions. However, speaking of the "imminent threat of the Russia breakthrough to Sumy" is clearly premature and unwise.
As for the prospects of further offensive actions by the Russians in this direction, they clearly have a maximum realistic prospect solely concerning a strip 15-20 km deep from the border (and even then, only under the most FAVORABLE conditions for the Russian forces, such as an unexpectedly sharp and catastrophic drop in the combat capability of the Ukrainian grouping deployed in this direction).
