As for the further prospects for developments in the Lyman sector — in the operational-tactical sense — I would highlight two main factors:
The position of Russian forces on their bridgehead north of Lyman continues to deteriorate, gradually but steadily. It appears that the command of Russia’s 20th Combined Arms Army will, one way or another, have to significantly reduce the size of this bridgehead. At the very least, because of continuing Ukrainian pressure on its southern and northern flanks, it will most likely be forced to withdraw its forward units east of the Nove–Stavky road.
The noticeable slowdown in the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army’s assault infiltration into Lyman, and even the withdrawal of its forward units in some areas — for example, southeast of Lyman — could eventually have a significant impact on the situation in the sector of the neighbouring Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army of the Yug Group of Forces, which is currently attempting to break through towards Mykolaivka and the Sloviansk Thermal Power Plant along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets.
If Ukrainian forces manage to completely push Russian troops out of the Lyman–Yampil–Ozerne–Dibrova area, the command of Russia’s 3rd Combined Arms Army will have to redeploy part of the forces on its right, or northern, flank and reorient them from facing west to facing north in order to hold the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets, at least along the Kryva Luka–Zakitne section. This, in turn, would inevitably affect its ability to continue advancing towards Sloviansk.
Even if Russia’s 25th Combined Arms Army manages to retain a tactical bridgehead west of the Chornyi Zherebets River — for example, between the river and the Zarichne–Yampil road — this would still have a sharply negative impact on the situation in the sector of Russia’s 3rd Combined Arms Army. In that case, Ukrainian forces operating north of the Siverskyi Donets would gain an obvious opportunity to counterattack the 3rd Combined Arms Army itself on its flank, even if only with relatively limited forces and resources.
In the broader operational-strategic sense — meaning Russia’s entire Sloviansk–Kramatorsk offensive operation — successful Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in the Lyman sector alone do not yet mean that the operation will completely and definitively fail this autumn. Russian forces continue to advance towards the agglomeration from the east and south with considerable intensity and, in some areas, with tactical success — in the Dobropillia, Kramatorsk–Kostiantynivka and Sloviansk sectors. Yes, slowly and with heavy losses, but they continue to “creep forward” there.
However, it must be acknowledged that the Ukrainian actions described above in the Lyman sector are clearly capable of creating the conditions for this Russian operational-strategic offensive to stall on at least one more operational-tactical axis — the Sloviansk sector.
