With the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, China has significantly expanded its presence in the Arctic. Whether the Arctic "eternal friendship" between Russia and China can transform into something else is explored in a study by Paul Goble for The Jamestown Foundation.
For the past three years, Beijing has actively developed cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. On one hand, the Kremlin is likely satisfied with this cooperation, as its own capabilities in the region are limited by Western sanctions. On the other hand, Moscow is concerned that China may strengthen its position and become the dominant power in the Arctic. Given that Russia's resources and attention are focused on the war against Ukraine, as well as China's ambitious Arctic programs concerning icebreaker construction and infrastructure development along and beyond the Northern Sea Route (NSR), there are grounds to believe that Russia's concerns are growing.
The researcher believes that the main cause of potential conflict between Beijing and Moscow lies in their differing approaches to Arctic issues. Russia has focused primarily on security and views the development of the NSR as a tool for strengthening its position in the region. China, on the other hand, is primarily interested in economic issues and the possibility of using the Northern Sea Route to expand trade with Europe and the West. Importantly, over the past decade, Beijing has made it clear that its "economic" approach is the foundation for advancing its security. This means Moscow is seeking economic survival now, while Beijing is pursuing long-term strategic achievements.
These differing strategic goals will lead to a conflict of interests between the two countries in the future.
"For Western countries, these different changes mean that responses to Russian and the PRC activities in the Arctic must recognize that these two actors sometimes coordinate as allies, but also sometimes engage as competitors. Any Western approaches must be designed in such a way that containing either the PRC or Russia now does not provide future opportunities for the other," the report reads.
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has expanded its activities in the Arctic since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Moscow needs PRC engagement in the Arctic as sanctions limit Russian activities, but fears the PRC will try to become the dominant power in the region.
- Moscow’s typically unspoken concerns are now greater than when the PRC positioned itself as “near Arctic” in 2018.
- Relations between Russia and the PRC in the Arctic are not necessarily headed toward an immediate breakdown or at a point where the West could easily exploit these differences. They are, however, critical developments to understand lest policies intended to contain one of these actors open new possibilities for expansion by the other.
