The dynamics of imperial projects closely resemble the evolution of stars in space.
The United States, for example, is a supernova.
It has a relatively short life cycle, yet is capable of dramatically increasing its luminosity and energy output. This can pose a danger to both its immediate and more distant periphery.
China, meanwhile, is a binary star that draws on the resources of celestial bodies entering its gravitational field.
Consider, for example, the China–Russia pairing.
Thanks to this strategy, China, despite its considerable age, manages to preserve its geopolitical "youth".
Here, we encounter an analogue of the cosmological Algol paradox, formulated in the mid-20th century by Soviet astronomers A. G. Masevich and P. P. Parenago.
The original cosmological principle governing stellar life cycles holds that hydrogen is exhausted more rapidly in a large star than in a smaller one. In other words, larger stars evolve faster.
The Algol paradox, named after the binary star system in which it was first identified, describes a situation in which the larger star in an interacting pair appears to evolve more slowly than the smaller one.
This occurs through a form of stellar cannibalism, whereby the larger star draws fuel from its smaller companion, thereby extending its own lifespan.
This kind of "geopolitical cannibalism" can be observed in the US–EU relationship, in which Europe is reluctant to become a donor to America, and vice versa; in the relationship between the United States and China, between the West and the Global South, and so on.
The phenomenon described above — the transfer of mass within closely connected geopolitical binary systems, where one partner can draw resources from another — is becoming a fundamental and defining feature of the 21st century, as globalisation enters a period of crisis.
Russia is an imperial system emitting relic radiation along the entire perimeter of its historical boundaries.
Britain, meanwhile, is a "white dwarf".
Once, it was a massive star — the British Empire — which, as its imperial project gradually exhausted itself, contracted into a relatively small physical entity while retaining enormous geopolitical gravity.
Britain cannot offer its partners a substantial export market, investment, breakthrough technologies or significant loans.
It cannot provide effective military assistance or supply or sell large quantities of weapons and ammunition.
Nor can it offer a "nuclear umbrella".
Yet Britain possesses INFLUENCE over political elites and the ability to keep its partners trapped within its geopolitical gravitational field.
Throughout the history of the British Empire, it has not produced a single successful project of geopolitical development. This contrasts with the United States, which has such examples to its credit: Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.
The United States itself became successful only after leaving the "British project".
Enterprises such as the East India Company and the British South Africa Company became models of harsh colonial rule.
In the 19th century, Indian princes and nawabs came to understand clearly that Britain could offer them a great deal on a personal, individual level — a knighthood, a place at the royal court in London — but could offer nothing to their principalities.
Each ultimately had to choose his own path: either establish a dynasty in London or build a genuinely sovereign development project in his homeland.
And this dichotomy has survived into the 21st century: Britain will not send troops to help, nor will it provide substantial quantities of weapons or money.
Instead, it will exert influence over the political elites of other countries.
