Ukraine's Defence Intelligence (DIU) has published information on the War&Sanctions portal about 30 pieces of foreign-made industrial equipment used by Russian enterprises involved in the production of ballistic missiles.
DIU noted that Russia's military-industrial complex remains heavily dependent on foreign technologies and that, despite its efforts, Russia is still unable to replace industrial equipment manufactured by leading international companies with domestically produced alternatives.
"Today, we are publishing information on 30 pieces of industrial equipment manufactured in China, Germany, Taiwan, the United States, Turkey, Switzerland and Italy, which are used by Russian factories producing ballistic missiles and their components, including altimeters, aerodynamic control surfaces, gyroscopes and other parts," DIU stated.
Ukrainian intelligence highlighted a growing presence of Chinese machine tools and machining centres, including five-axis systems, at Russian defence enterprises.
According to DIU, Chinese machine tools incorporate European, Japanese and Taiwanese components, including computer numerical control (CNC) systems, servo drives, high-precision spindles and bearings, measurement and rotary systems, linear guides, and equipment for thermal stabilisation and monitoring of machining processes.
Among the equipment disclosed on Monday was the GX-650 five-axis universal machining centre manufactured by China's Hyper Machine Tool. The machine is used by the Votkinsk Plant, which produces 9M723 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and the missile section of the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile.
DIU also published information on Shtral turning and milling machining centres manufactured in China and used in the production processes of JSC PEMZ Molot, which manufactures electronic equipment units for Iskander-M missiles.
The disclosures also included measuring equipment produced by Germany's Rohde & Schwarz and installed at UPKB Detal, an enterprise that manufactures altimeters for Zircon missiles.
DIU emphasised that depriving Russia of the ability to continue its war requires, among other measures, stronger controls over end users and the actual locations where equipment is installed and operated.
Such measures should include on-site inspections by authorised representatives at the declared installation addresses.
Enhanced control procedures should also cover spare parts, components, technical fluids, consumables, software, updates and maintenance services required to operate the equipment.
To further restrict Russia's ability to sustain its war, DIU called for regular audits of distributors, dealers and other intermediaries, particularly those supplying products to high-risk jurisdictions, to identify signs of re-export or changes in the declared end user.
This would require investigating cases in which manufacturers' products are discovered within Russia's military-industrial complex, tracing their supply chains and taking measures to prevent further deliveries through the intermediaries involved.
DIU also called for restrictions on the supply of CNC systems, tools and other components to Chinese manufacturers whose equipment is supplied to Russian defence enterprises.
