By Tigran Avakyan for Romanenko Channel
Trump’s main adversary is China. Victory over China in this confrontation is, in fact, virtually inevitable. The level of confrontation will reach its peak in the coming years, in 2028–2029. Defeating China is the number one strategic problem. Without defeating China, it is impossible to resolve the issue with Russia. Any actions by Russia to strengthen its influence in Eastern Europe only strengthen China.
To understand Trump and what his likely successors are doing, it is necessary to realize that defeating China is Trump’s second priority. Trump’s number one task is defeating the Democrats in the United States.
Number two is China. After solving these tasks, the third priority is consolidating U.S. allies around the United States.
There is a principle at work here. Trump acts very harshly: hostility toward enemies, and full support for allies. Now let’s take a closer look.
In order to build a strategic foothold in Europe, right-wing forces must win in Poland. At present, this has not happened. The construction of such a foothold—something American officials refer to both openly and indirectly—will only be possible once Poland decisively shifts “to the right.” Relying on Orbán or Fico, even if they were to unite, amounts to nothing. Orbán and Fico will do whatever Poland does. At that point, Poland will become the key determinant. Neither Fico nor Orbán is permanent; they are highly dependent actors, essentially maneuvering to extract resources—whether through energy, cooperation with China, or cooperation with Russia.
That is why I view all of Trump’s policy through the prism of the Trump–China conflict. China and Trump are operating under extremely tight time constraints.
Xi has already spoken the word “Taiwan.” He cannot avoid acting on Taiwan; he will be forced to do so—if not in 2028, then by 2029 at the latest. Either he will act himself or his successors will, representing his vision. By political standards, Xi is still relatively young. But where is the trap for Xi? Where is Trump pushing things, and why was this “Taiwan bait” offered to Xi?
The point is—and this can be verified by military statistics—that Xi can transport a maximum of 110,000 troops to Taiwan.
That is assuming the entire Chinese fleet is used to transport landing forces to Taiwan. By the most conservative estimates, 35–37% of that fleet would be destroyed before reaching the shore. Sixty to seventy thousand troops are not just insufficient to capture Taiwan, which has a million-strong, ultra-modern military—they are only enough to hold bridgeheads in the north and east of the island for about three days. That is the full extent of China’s capability. Yes, China would launch ballistic missile strikes. Yes, China would blockade the delivery of food and all components to Taiwan. But the situation today is such that China has effectively declared a Taiwan operation and can no longer back away from it. That is where it is being pushed. Moreover, China cannot actually enter this operation, because it has no outcome other than defeat and a long, drawn-out war—even if the United States does not assist Taiwan. That is the first part.
So what does China do? China is now using Russia to provoke the United States and Europe as much as possible, in order to inflict damage on the West, because it has no other means to do so. The countries China controls cannot inflict such damage. Not North Korea, despite its nuclear weapons, because China is fundamentally opposed to the use of nuclear weapons. Not Laos, not Cambodia, not the Maldives, not Myanmar—and there is no one else. China’s resources are extremely limited.
A fierce struggle is now underway over the following question: if Russia collapses completely—which China does not want—China will be forced to expand in order to take control of territories, for example the Siberian region.
The issue is that many actors now want to “freeze” the situation in its current state. By “many,” I mean the forces represented by Trump, so that further conceptual decisions can be made later. All of Trump’s conceptual decisions lie in two main dimensions. The first is defeating the Democrats and depriving them of their financial and social base; to do that, he must destabilize all left-wing regimes across the European continent—Greater Europe, not just the European Union. That is the first part. The second, of course, is the China factor: making life as difficult as possible for China, even through maneuvers involving Russia. Because China, which has Russia in a chokehold, is nervous regardless.
And we should view Trump’s policy not from the perspective of Poland or Ukraine, but from the perspective of Trump’s team and their worldview.
