At the moment, there are no clear operational-scale or operational-nature ambitions seen in the actions of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border territory in the Sumy region related to the desire to "take Sumy"—at least not yet.
Moreover, from an objective standpoint, in order even to ATTEMPT to carry this out, the enemy command would need to accomplish two “preliminary” tasks, namely:
• Capture and HOLD convenient (necessary) areas and lines for operational deployment corresponding to the large-scale task of “capturing Sumy,” including the required volume and composition of the grouping (groupings).
• And most importantly, find ADDITIONAL forces and means for this. Because, in its current composition, the enemy’s "Kursk" group of troops is only suitable for "buffering" our border area, nothing more.
I fully admit that the Russian command may have some operational intentions (plans) for a “breakthrough to Sumy.” However, you have to agree there is a considerable distance between “wanting” and “being capable” of doing it.
Under current war conditions, adding one additional motorized rifle division (even with a couple of attached mobilization regiments) to the group of troops does NOT mean “we will take Sumy tomorrow.”
To illustrate this more clearly, consider the following indicators:
The enemy’s 2.5 combined-arms armies have been “taking” Pokrovsk for over half a year; another 2 armies still cannot fully “capture” Toretsk; 2 armies (including one truly “unique” tank army, unmatched anywhere else in the world) have been “taking Kupiansk” for a similar period, and so on.
Therefore, regarding the “prospect of taking Sumy,” the activity of ONE (just one) additional enemy motorized rifle division in the border area of Sumy region, forgive me, is unimpressive. Not to mention that Sumy is still not Pokrovsk or Toretsk.
