By Vladislav Inozemtsev for Kremlin’s BezBashennik
Judging by everything, the rift in Russian-American relations, which became a consequence of yet another “dizziness from success,” has turned out to be far more unpleasant for the Kremlin than it tried to portray. Sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil have frozen the largest volume of Russian oil in history in an unrealized state and inflicted irreparable damage on the country’s largest (pseudo)private oil company.
However, right now I want to focus not on the fate of the budget amid declining oil shipments (especially since yesterday the Ministry of Finance attracted almost 2 trillion rubles in loans in a single day) and not on the concerns of Russian billionaires. Judging by everything, V. Putin, who initially continued “out of inertia” to escalate the situation by describing a new nuclear wunderwaffe, very quickly “slowed down” as soon as it became clear that the U.S. could just as well conduct nuclear tests, and that sanctions on the Russian oil sector were not going to be lifted.
As a result, we have recently seen several symbolic actions. First, a demonstrative (though I am not sure how deep) offense at S. Lavrov, whose rudeness, most likely, caused the problem—despite some press interviews, the foreign minister has stopped appearing near the president. Second, the visit of K.-Zh. Tokayev to Moscow was clearly not accidental: the Kazakh president had just visited Washington, calling D. Trump a “messenger of the Almighty,” so in the Kremlin he was in a somewhat special capacity. Third, the very timely “emergence” of details from the conversation between Y. Ushakov and J. Powell, advisor to the British Prime Minister, deserves attention—particularly Moscow’s emphasis on the worthlessness of Powell’s ideas and thoughts. And finally, it was almost a sensation that the Kremlin granted the highest permission to sell Russia’s Citibank to Renaissance Capital (rather than turning yet another asset owned by investors from a hostile country into state revenue). The impression arises that the Kremlin wants, at any cost, to resume the “strategic dialogue” with the United States.
Whether this will succeed or not is not an easy question. On the one hand, D. Trump is not burning all bridges: recently, the U.S. announced a desire to soften the tone of the anti-Russian resolution at the UN. On the other hand, Washington surely wants to see a substantive change in Russia’s position, not more promises or chocolates with quotes from V. Putin. Therefore, it seems to me that—although signals from the Kremlin will surely be noticed—it is far from obvious that they can trigger a new tone in the dialogue. As I suggested several months ago, there is no economic basis for U.S.-Russian cooperation: Moscow simply has nothing to offer its partner. And there is no movement on the main front (both figuratively and literally) and none is expected. Therefore, all we can do now is observe what is happening, trying to discern elements of serious trends in the small movements…
