While the 40-day detox from Russian propaganda and return to reality is gaining momentum, let’s put together a second, more elaborate conspiracy theory.
- In recent weeks, the airwaves have been filled with talk about possible Russian provocations against NATO. This is because Ukraine is showing tangible results on Russian territory, and the Kremlin, for various reasons (purely military ones — to halt support; domestic and foreign policy ones…), has increasing motivation to shake Europe. The period of heightened risk begins closer to August.
However.
An adventure against Europe is a “high-margin” but epically high-risk undertaking. If something goes wrong, there will be no mercy.
Therefore, alternative options are likely being studied — some kind of “move” that would shift attention and blur the current failure.
- The first option is the occupation of Belarus. I previously wrote about Lukashenko’s physical condition. Putin is facing growing pressure on the Minsk leader from Ukraine. Lukashenko is trying to convince him of full loyalty, but the situation has changed — his weakness has been noticed by everyone.
Russia situationally needs support in the form of Belarusian fuel, but Ukraine may start cutting it off on Russian territory even without striking refineries directly. That is, the damage is inevitable.
Something happens in Minsk in August, and Russia steps in with major “assistance.” Moscow has already organized a provocation involving an attack on Belarusian children; the next move would be on Belarusian territory itself.
Europe’s reaction would be close to none; China’s position matters more. Putin could explain to Beijing that Lukashenko is on his way out anyway, and this way control is preserved while Chinese interests remain intact.
The key point is that a Russian push to the Polish border could impress Europe (especially Germany) even without direct strikes on NATO territory.
The balance of pros and cons can be debated, but this option is on the table.
The second option is Armenia. Technically, this is more complex and less visible. It does not solve the “appeasement of Europe” task. Plus, the US and Iran are trying to stabilize the region. So this option is not the most urgent.
And here a backup option appears — Kazakhstan.
- Kazakhstan’s specificity is that it is a state with potential far beyond its region. It is a giant, though still standing on very thin legs (more on that below).
First, we tend to view Kazakhstan through the lens of useful raw materials. But its main strength is its excellent demographic situation. The next generation (up to 2050) could become a period of prosperity, while others struggle with labor shortages and migration management.
Second, resources. It is a treasure trove — an Aladdin’s cave with no visible bottom or walls. A few points:
Kazakhstan produces about 100 million tons of oil per year (and potentially significantly more; Russia produces about 500 million tons and is reducing output). About 18% is consumed domestically, around 82% is exported.
Kazakhstan processes about 17.6 million tons of oil, producing about 14.5 million tons of petroleum products, which roughly covers domestic demand.
Kazakhstan produces about 63 billion cubic meters of gas, but most is associated gas reinjected into fields. Domestic consumption is about 24 bcm.
In short — a surplus across hydrocarbons, not to mention metals, uranium, etc.
The “thin legs” of this giant are:
- First, Kazakhstan is trapped in infrastructure and logistics dependence. Most exports go through Russia using Russian infrastructure. This cannot be changed quickly.
Second, it remains largely a raw materials exporter with limited processing industry.
For example, its fuel market is served by three aging refineries controlled by the state (and partially Chinese interests). Kazakhstan wants privatization in exchange for modernization, but there are bottlenecks.
Even if fuel is produced domestically, exporting it still depends on Russia. Geography matters.
Part of Kazakhstan’s gas is processed in Russia (notably at the Orenburg gas processing plant). Where to send increased volumes is unclear.
Third, the vast territory creates security vulnerabilities, including risks linked to religious extremism.
Historically, Russia acted as a stabilizing partner, participating in cooperation and investment.
But Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is changing this. And 2026 events (successful long-range strikes) could accelerate the process.
- Russia is no longer perceived as a security donor, as shown by the de facto collapse of the CSTO.
Drone and missile strikes make Russia an unreliable partner. As soon as fuel problems begin in Russia, neighboring countries face issues as well.
Kazakhstan may therefore gradually decouple from Russian cooperation, even at initial economic cost.
Russia’s war has also reduced investment in its energy sector, causing long-term degradation.
- A major example is the gas-chemical industry.
Kazakhstan is building large-scale petrochemical production with Russian (Sibur) and Chinese participation, and Western technologies.
A major polypropylene plant (500,000 tons/year) was launched in 2022. A polyethylene complex (1.25 million tons/year) is planned, with pipelines and gas separation infrastructure under construction.
This will be operational around 2027–2029.
As a result, Kazakhstan may become a regional competitor in petrochemicals, reducing Russia’s influence.
- The implication is that Russia is losing industrial dominance while Kazakhstan is rising as a production hub integrated into China’s Belt and Road system.
Kazakhstan may shift from transit territory to joint manufacturing center with China, while Russia risks becoming primarily a raw-material supplier.
This could also reshape regional markets and weaken Russian influence in Central Asia, Turkey, and parts of Europe.
Even after the war ends, sanctions will not fully disappear, giving Kazakhstan further structural advantage.
- In such a scenario, Russia may try to destabilize Kazakhstan, including via internal tensions or external incidents framed as Ukrainian actions.
Kazakhstan would be in a vulnerable position due to limited external security guarantees.
China would be reluctant to intervene militarily; the US would be distracted elsewhere.
This could make Kazakhstan a future geopolitical pressure point in negotiations involving Russia.
Conclusion:
Moscow is stumbling, losing momentum, and already falling behind by at least a decade, while Kazakhstan is dynamically gaining strength and reshaping the regional balance.
As a result, Kazakhstan could become a magnet not only for Central Asia but also for parts of Russia itself — and that is already a different level of risk.
All of this is speculation. But not necessarily impossible.
