Alexander Kovalenko, a military-political observer for the Information Resistance group stated in his Telegram that the majority of all strikes in September were concentrated in the Odessa region, targeting the Danube port infrastructure and grain hubs.

On the night of October 1, Russians launched 30 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones into Ukraine, of which 16 were successfully intercepted. "It is possible that these incidents will not be included in the total count for September, but I will include them since the launch occurred at 20:30 on September 30," wrote Kovalenko.

Thus, an absolute record was set in September for the use of Shahed-136 by Russians, totaling 521 instances. The previous record was in May 2023 when Russians used 413 kamikaze drones. There was then a decrease in the intensity of attacks, with 197 in June, 246 in July, and 167 in August.

Photo: Alexander Kovalenko Facebook page

"I cannot definitively say whether this high number is a result of the production of Shahed-136 in Russia, as available information indicates that they have faced significant production problems. For the first half of 2023, Russia had planned to produce an experimental batch of 100 kamikaze drones solely using their own resources in a closed cycle, but they were unable to do so.

Delivery schedules were disrupted because the acute dependence on contraband spare parts imports persisted, and Russia is unlikely to transition to a closed cycle production from scratch in the near future regarding Shahed-136, maintaining its reliance on Iran.

Has Iran increased production volumes, leading to Russia's ability to increase the intensity of attacks? To some extent, yes, but with nuances.

The fact is, when Russia turned to Iran for Shahed-136 supplies, the production capacity, which consisted exclusively of manual assembly rather than automated production, allowed for the assembly of up to 50 Shahed-136 drones per month. By the end of 2022, Iran managed to increase production to 100 Shahed-136 per month. It is possible that by May, this figure had reached 150-200.

I would like to note that in February, March, and April, the intensity of attacks was below 100 per month. This means that by that time, the Russians may have been accumulating kamikaze drones.

For this reason, the September air raid could have become a record due to the use of accumulated kamikaze drones. However, this does not negate Russia's attempts to establish its own production while regularly receiving kamikaze drones from Iran.

And, most importantly, the majority of all strikes in September were concentrated in the Odessa region, targeting the Danube port infrastructure and grain hubs. Russians continue their grain terror, using variable routes to find directions with the least anti-aircraft components. With the reduction in the number of downed Shahed-136 drones, they have been successful in this regard.

This once again raises the question of our partners providing more air defense systems, both cannon and anti-aircraft missile systems, to counter Shahed-136. Because every thousand tons of burnt grain in the ports of Reni or Izmail means hungry indigenous tribes somewhere in the Sahel region, and a thousand new 'citizens' of the EU arriving there daily, who 'wholeheartedly share' European values, 'love' French philosophy, and admire Renaissance-era painting."