During talks in Riyadh, the United States and the Russian Federation discussed the issue of a ceasefire at sea—the new "Grain Deal." At first glance, this seems paradoxical because:
• Ukrainian ports are already operational, handling not only grain carriers but also ships transporting other goods.
• The Russian Federation also exports its goods through the Black Sea ports.
If we compare the situation to 2022, when Ukraine's maritime traffic in the Black Sea was effectively blocked, today the need for a "grain deal" is not as critical. However, there is a certain logic behind these talks that goes beyond the Russia-Ukraine war. The key question is which state will gain or maintain dominance in the Black Sea region, and which global players will gain access to the Black Sea in the future, thereby advancing their interests in the region.
As of today, on one hand, shipping continues both from Ukraine and Russia—yes, under fire, but on a relatively large scale. On the other hand, compared to 2022, Russia's position has significantly weakened. Specifically:
• The Russian Black Sea Fleet was forced to evacuate from Sevastopol and its Crimean bases and is now located in the port of Novorossiysk. Moreover, discussions are underway about hiding part of the fleet in the ports of unrecognized Abkhazia.
• Ukraine has significantly increased its ability to strike Russian Federation targets, including at sea and on coastal infrastructure, particularly port facilities.
Russia's weakening naturally leads to the strengthening of another Black Sea power—Turkey. Over the past three years, Turkey has:
• Closed the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and, in the future, will significantly enhance its influence in the South Caucasus after the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, partly by weakening Russia’s position in Armenia.
• Brought to power a coalition in Syria, predominantly consisting of pro-Turkish forces, while weakening the position of the Kurds, who still receive U.S. support.
• Signed an agreement with the Libyan government in Tripoli on hydrocarbon extraction in Libya's Mediterranean waters, surpassing not only Russia but also the U.S.
• Implemented a policy to connect Caspian Basin countries to the European oil and gas markets via its territory.
• Collaborated with China on the southern route of the Belt and Road Initiative, leading to significant growth in Turkish and Chinese influence in Southeast Europe.
• Actively entered Africa, focusing on military-technical cooperation, including arms trade and military advisory services.
• Finally, is constructing the "Istanbul Canal," which could, if necessary and politically feasible for Ankara, effectively "nullify" the Montreux Convention.
At first glance, this process might seem beneficial to the U.S. But there are several counterarguments to this thesis:
• The Turkish government cannot be easily categorized as one that will blindly follow U.S. policies. On the contrary, Ankara may be a tactical ally of Washington, but only on a tactical level.
• Turning Turkey into a regional superpower creates problems for the U.S. policy of forming pro-American regional coalitions, particularly regarding the "inter-sea" project, which should ideally include powerful Black Sea countries like Romania. However, if there is already a "superpower" in the region, it remains to be seen how loyal Bucharest will be to this idea, especially if Ankara offers its own format.
• Turkey's cooperation with China and its future projects, like the Iraq Development Road and the Istanbul Canal, allow China to strengthen its "Southern European" axis of influence, comprising Romania, Hungary, and Serbia.
• Turkey’s policy of helping Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan export hydrocarbons via Turkish (or Azerbaijani) territory gives Europe access to relatively cheap raw materials, which diminishes the "carrot" for Putin that was previously provided by the idea of Russia returning to the European gas market (via joint ventures with the U.S.). If gas from Central Asia becomes available, there will be fewer supporters for Gazprom's return to the European market.
Aside from these "Turkish" factors, there are issues related to Ukraine. The security of Odessa? Unlikely. There is another object—the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)—an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russian Black Sea ports. It is 24% owned by American companies, 24% by Lukoil, and another 24% by the Russian state. The CPC infrastructure has already been targeted; just less than a month ago, there was a major fire at the CPC pumping station "Kropotkinskaya." Just yesterday, drones struck the area.
Now let’s talk about what a new "grain deal" would entail. A ban on strikes against ships and port infrastructure would allow Russia to restore operations at the CPC and partially return its Black Sea fleet to Sevastopol. The Russians would once again establish observation bases on the "Boyko Towers."
This would significantly strengthen Russia in the region, restoring its positions from late 2022. Additionally, the U.S. would no longer have to answer questions about why Russian fertilizers are formally under sanctions but are still freely sold thanks to General License No. 6 (which has been renewed every six months since the end of 2022).
Turkey, on the other hand, loses the opportunity to use Russia's weakness to greatly enhance its influence in the Black Sea region by 2025. As a result, Turkish-Chinese initiatives will face new conditions and restrictions. On one hand, the U.S. is not thrilled by China's growing influence, and on the other hand, Russia will not be pleased with an alternative for Chinese transit through its territory.
This logic explains why the Black Sea issue has suddenly become a priority for the U.S. For Trump, it’s important to secure agreements (involving the U.S.) in the Black Sea region before the U.S.-China summit. This would give him more leverage, using his "strong card" logic.
For Russia, the idea of a grain deal is also beneficial for another reason. Putin needs Ukraine to say "no" to a certain format of agreement. Reviving the "grain deal" from Ukraine’s perspective is absurd. However, Ukraine has previously invested a lot of effort in promoting the idea that such agreements are humanitarian, aimed at helping weaker states. Today, rejecting such an agreement would weaken Ukraine’s position.
Are there alternatives for Ukraine’s own policy?
• On one hand, Ukraine could target Russia’s port infrastructure before any deal is concluded. But the question is whether there is enough of a resource base for this.
• On the other hand, Ukraine could consult with Turkey and Romania on potential responses to such challenges, and ideally, involve China as well.
• Ukraine could try to set additional conditions, such as restrictions for the Russian Black Sea Fleet or the demilitarization of gas platforms. The key would be to buy time, possibly proposing a "ceasefire in the air," a concept that was initially articulated. For this, a certain level of political flexibility and the ability to balance the interests of partners would be required.
