Between June 17 and June 28, the official dollar-to-ruble exchange rate jumped from 73.11 to 77.06 — and each of these points reflects not a market equilibrium, but a systemic inability of Moscow to maintain its financial facade.
The Central Bank of the Russian Federation has itself weakened the system: starting June 17, it reduced daily foreign currency sales by 34.5%, from $105.1 million to $68.8 million as of June 27. Less currency on the market means less support for the exchange rate.
After the partial restoration of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, Brent oil fell to $73.08 per barrel — 38% below its May peak. Russian Urals crude, burdened by sanctions discounts, dropped to $60.11. For the Russian budget, which depends on hydrocarbon revenues, this is a gap that must be plugged somehow.
On June 22, the Moscow Exchange index fell by 4.23% in a single day to 2318 points, and on June 26 it remained at 2285 — near its lowest levels since March 2023. Investors were massively buying foreign currency — both businesses and individuals trying to preserve savings.
Above all this hangs a deadline: on July 1, the suspension of foreign exchange operations under the budget rule expires. What comes next, Moscow has not publicly decided. The Russian Ministry of Finance is simultaneously considering lowering the oil “cut-off price” in the budget rule for 2027. The market reads this clearly: there will be less currency support.
Against this backdrop, most Russian financial analysts forecast further weakening of the ruble. In July, the dollar is expected to remain in the 77–78 ruble range, and by the end of the year it could reach 80–85.
For the Kremlin, a weaker ruble has become a tool of budget survival: a cheaper currency boosts ruble-denominated revenue from oil exports. But the cost of this maneuver is accelerating inflation, more expensive imports, and further erosion of business expectations. Conversely, any attempt to defend the exchange rate by force would deplete the foreign currency reserves needed to finance the war.
Moscow has fallen into its own trap: the more it spends on the war, the fewer levers it has left to defend the ruble — and vice versa.
