By Iliya Kusa
The de facto head of Syria, Ahmad al-Sharaa, visited Russia for the first time and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The obvious topic of discussions was the status of Russian military bases in Latakia and Tartus. A less obvious topic involved counterbalancing Turkey and Israel, as well as reviving the Syrian economy.
For Russia, the experience of hosting former adversaries as situational partners within the framework of "acknowledging realities on the ground" is not unprecedented. A similar approach was taken with the Taliban. Moreover, it is already known that Russia itself established contact with militants from the former group “Tahrir al-Sham” when it became clear that Bashar Assad’s government could not hold power.
For the Syrian leadership, the visit to Russia was necessary to diversify foreign policy and create a counterweight to Israel and Turkey, whose influence is growing exponentially, threatening to trap Damascus in geopolitical pressure and limit the political ambitions of the current ruling groups.
They hope to achieve this with Russia in Syria in three ways:
1. Play the Russian bases card, promising to preserve them in exchange for Moscow’s assistance. Essentially, al-Sharaa assured that Russian bases would remain in Syria. This allows Russia to maintain its African logistics and a foothold on the Mediterranean coast.
2. Convince Russia to return its peacekeepers/military police to border regions. This would create a deterrent factor against Israel and Turkey, and restore Russia’s role as an arbiter on the ground in complex areas where territories of different factions and clans intersect.
3. Attract Russian investments, humanitarian aid (wheat and oil), and weapons. Syria needs spare parts for Soviet/post-Soviet equipment still in use by the Syrian army, new weapons—especially air defense systems—and unilateral humanitarian aid that was previously supplied by Russia under Assad. However, Russia currently faces problems exporting weapons due to the ongoing war in Ukraine.
I believe no immediate agreements will be reached. But it can be assumed that, at least for the near future, the issue of Russian bases is settled, and they will remain in Syria untouched. The next steps will depend on Moscow’s willingness to return to its former political role in Damascus, as well as on whether the current Syrian authorities can maintain control and whether factions opposing renewed cooperation with Moscow gain strength.
