Russia has made every effort to separate the issue of Russian-American relations from the Russia-Ukraine war. Broadly speaking, the framework has been, and remains, as follows: there are "great opportunities" (today, there are already draft agreements on the table, and money can be made). The war, meanwhile, is an unfortunate inconvenience that should not interfere with business, but nevertheless gets in the way.
The United States operates according to a logic of access to resources, access to markets and the protection of its interests. Under Trump, these principles (rather than values) are explicitly set out in the National Security Strategy. Moreover, Trump himself thinks in business terms, especially when there is an opportunity for people he cares about to make money.
This approach has worked. But the question now is a meeting with Trump. Such meetings are held either to demonstrate a particular political position (in which case they are public) or to finalise certain agreements. In our case, we can speak of finalisation. In other words, the Russian proposal has been calculated, each side's share of the profits has been determined, and all that remains is to seal the deal.
For the United States and Trump, however, this is not just about money. After the midterm elections, he needs a narrative of "victory" in Iran. And that involves Russian-Iranian cooperation, the global oil market and nuclear materials. After all, the removal of at least some enriched uranium from the Islamic Republic could be presented as the achievement of the original objective.
There is a second consideration. After the midterm elections, against the backdrop of the prolonged Iranian saga, Trump's position ahead of another round of negotiations with Xi looks, to put it mildly, rather pathetic. Over the past month, the United States has managed to significantly complicate its relations with its allies. China, meanwhile, has hosted the Sultan of Oman and the President of Germany in the past week alone, held talks with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and renewed trade agreements with Switzerland, Peru and... Canada.
And this is where Trump needs Putin. And Russia as a whole — a Russia emerging from sanctions and attempting to restore its influence in several regions. This would be a "blow below the belt" to China's expanding influence.
In short, Trump desperately needs Russia. Putin understands this perfectly well and is dangling a sweetener. That sweetener could take the form of:
- An agreement on the development of Arctic resources.
- The participation of American companies in Arctic projects (logistics and ports) and hydrocarbon extraction in the Russian Far East.
- Joint trade in hydrocarbons in Europe.
- Imports of technological equipment from the United States or American companies.
- A convergence of positions on proposed new nuclear non-proliferation agreements (which, incidentally, is why Russia has once again started talking about the nuclear threat).
And in Trump's logic, the realisation of such brilliant prospects is being obstructed by an "unfortunate inconvenience" — the war. But the United States needs Russia. Putin is therefore raising the stakes and once again attempting to operate through ultimatums, demanding maximum concessions from Ukraine, European NATO members and the EU.
To Trump, this proposal also looks reasonable: after all, it is "Europe" that would be making the concessions, allowing him to tell Americans that "it cost us nothing".
Moreover, the mere signing of some kind of "peace agreement" on Ukraine, even at Ukraine's expense, could be presented as a foreign policy success. The issue of the war could then be removed from the agenda.
What does this mean? It means that the next two months will be marked by considerable pressure from the United States. And active Ukrainian diplomacy during this period will be more important than ever.
EU countries, incidentally, can see what lies ahead. That is why, over the past week, several countries have announced substantial new aid packages for Ukraine. Not out of excessive affection, but out of rational calculation: Trump's deal, which would "cost Americans nothing", would be paid for out of European pockets. Helping Ukraine is cheaper than the potential losses.
But what happens next if Trump fails?
We would then enter a process in which the negotiating framework could potentially be revised. For such a revision to be meaningful, and to establish a format in which Putin would be compelled to participate, a sufficiently broad group of mediators would be needed.
In addition to the United States and the EU, this group should include countries on which Russia depends: Turkey, India and China.
And this brings us back to the question of Ukrainian diplomatic activity, above all that of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the need to talk in terms of interests.
After all, it was precisely an appeal to interests that made Dmitriev's diplomatic track with the United States work. The approach is effective.
Secondly, appealing to "European values" when talking to Asian countries, or even Turkey, may not be particularly sensible.
This is a particularly difficult challenge — one that Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the President must resolve before the New Year.
