I’ve been looking at some assessments of the actions of the Russian command from a rather large number of, shall we say, “info‑people,” and I’m surprised by their content regarding this war.
If you listen to them, watch them and read them, you might get the impression that the Russian command are bloodthirsty, stupid and clumsy monsters who continuously send personnel “to the slaughter” and don’t know any other methods or ways of organising and conducting combat operations...
Perhaps, from an informational‑psychological point of view, that kind of message is appropriate, but from the standpoint of a measured, rational assessment and analysis of the enemy’s actions — absolutely not.
It breeds complacency and helps create a distorted view of the enemy’s real capabilities and capacities...
For some reason we have decided that the Russian command learns nothing and does not take into account experience (including its own) from the ongoing war when planning and organising combat at the tactical and operational levels.
The imaginary “scheme” that these domestic experts and “info‑people” draw for us is simple.
Allegedly, the Russians herd a bunch of personnel into a chosen direction, create an overwhelming numerical advantage there, and then try to break through the Ukrainian defence system with “meat assaults.”
Everything seems clear and simple (especially to an ordinary Ukrainian citizen) and fits the canons that, according to our “experts,” are accepted in the “Soviet‑Russian General Staff”...
In reality things are far more complicated and, to put it mildly, different... the Russians are learning — and at all three main levels of command: tactical, operational and strategic.
For example:
Everyone remembers the assaults by Russian troops on Bakhmut and Avdiivka, Toretsk and Chasiv Yar... how they were organised by the Russian command, how they actually unfolded and what they cost.
But compare that with what is happening now in Kupiansk and Pokrovsk... compare the methods and techniques the Russian command is using tactically now with those they used before...
Remember that their tactics of “infiltration” and “covert penetration” had to be taught to Russian troops (and on a large scale) instead of frontal assaults and storming urban blocks, while at the same time organising coordination and resilient command of troops (at least at the tactical level) — and that capability has, in fact, emerged from the current situation.
So, dear colleagues, don’t underestimate the enemy.
