The aggressor state, Russia, is attempting to restore and increase its arms production, and in the autumn-winter period, it will once again target Ukraine's energy infrastructure.
This information was conveyed by a representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Vadim Skibitsky, in a conversation with Sofiya Sereda for Ukrainska Pravda.
The key points from the interview:
In September, the use of combat drones (unmanned aerial vehicles) significantly increased. Additionally, in recent weeks, the enemy has increased the usage of what are known as guided aviation bombs.
During the spring and early summer, the Russians were using around 30 such guided aviation bombs daily. Currently, this number has risen to over 70.
Russia's goal is to destroy our energy infrastructure and other critical objects to inflict as much damage on us as possible, and possibly destabilize our internal situation in certain regions because it will undoubtedly affect our civilian population.
Ukraine's military intelligence closely monitors issues related to the production of any critical, especially so-called "precision" weaponry, drones, and other types of weapons by Russia.
Unfortunately, despite economic sanctions and current restrictions on the supply of various products to Russia, it still manages to import the necessary components for weapons production using third-party countries.
There has been a decrease in the use of air-launched missiles. We also see that Russia has begun to more actively use both cruise and ballistic missiles of the "Iskander" complex.
Furthermore, Russia constantly changes its tactics [of shelling] to deliver as many precise strikes as possible and accumulate weaponry for attacks on our objects.
The aggressor has resumed the production of Kalibr and Kh-101 missiles and is attempting to increase the volumes. However, according to our data, not all of their plans in Russia are being executed.
The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the intelligence community, the Security Service of Ukraine, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine are doing everything they can to target facilities involved in the production of precision weaponry, which is intended for use by the Russian Federation.
Before the start of summer, the Russians were using ammunition from their stockpiles. These munitions were manufactured over 30 years ago, and their operational readiness did not exceed fifty percent.
Currently, the aggressor state is actively trying to find munitions in other countries. For example, they are working extensively with the industrial sector in Belarus to restore and increase production. For the Russians, this is critical for 122mm and 152mm projectiles, as well as rocket munitions for systems like "Uragan," "Smerch," and "Grad."
Both Europe and the United States were not prepared for the production of such a large quantity of munitions that we are currently using.
According to confirmed data, Russia has been using approximately 15,000 munitions per day since the beginning of October. This is a very significant production volume.
Both in Europe and in America, it is understood that without expanding production, we will not be able to obtain the quantity of munitions needed for our Defense Forces.
Russia's plans for 2024 are to produce 2,100,000 munitions. According to our information, without assistance from other countries, Russia will not be able to achieve this.
The aggressor state is actively taking heavy equipment and artillery systems from storage, restoring them to operational condition to equip new military units and formations being created by Russia.
Specifically, efforts are being made to rebuild the 104th Airborne Division of Russia. The formation of new armies is ongoing, such as the 25th Army of the Central Military District of Russia, which is already involved in combat operations on our territory, but the issue of arming them remains a challenge.
We attempt to target critical elements of the Russian defense-industrial complex. Some of these production facilities are unique in their kind.
For example, if we can strike an object where a particular component is manufactured, and this component can only be produced at that specific facility, it allows us to reduce the speed of weapon production or even completely halt it.
We have our own methodology for identifying the most critical objects of the Russian military-industrial complex and disabling them, not only through drone strikes but also using other methods to damage, delay, and prevent mass production of weapons on Russian territory.
