The Kursk operation began on August 6, 2024. At that time, around 11,000 Russian soldiers were stationed in the Kursk region, mostly conscripts. The peak area of the Defence Forces of Ukraine control in the Kursk region during the operation was 1,300 km².
Currently, there are around 60,000 Russian soldiers in the Kursk region, with losses over nearly 6 months totaling 38,000 killed, wounded, and captured.
Thus, the total concentration of Russian forces has reached nearly 100,000 over the course of almost six months, an increase of nearly 90,000 from the initial grouping.
In essence, the number of troops in the Kursk region is comparable to a combined arms army and a couple of divisions.
The effect of this concentration of forces and resources was only partial, not complete, control of the Kursk region by Russian authorities. As of today, the Defence Forces of Ukraine control approximately 630 km² either fully or partially (the gray zone). In other words, throughout the entire Kursk operation, Russian forces managed to regain control of 670 km², losing 38,000 personnel in the process, which averages to 57 people per 1 km².
An important aspect is the constraint of Russian forces on Russian territory itself, forcing them to systematically expend resources and forces in clashes in the Kursk region, while these 90,000 soldiers could have been elsewhere, for example near Kupiansk or Pokrovsk, or even on the Orikhiv direction.
But these are all military factors and their effects within the Kursk operation, negatively impacting the combat capability of Russian forces and the reputation of the Putin regime, which is forced to fight on its own territory in the third year of the war. There is another factor, which is not often discussed – the humanitarian one.
Around 150,000 people fled the fighting in the Kursk region. About 30,000 are housed in temporary accommodation centers, which are turning into permanent housing. The remaining refugees either found places to stay independently or live with relatives, etc.
Meanwhile, the Putin regime is unable to cope with this humanitarian challenge. People are not receiving payments, even the meager 10-15 thousand rubles, humanitarian aid is untimely, there is a lack of employment, and so on. The authorities of the Kursk region, represented by the acting governor Alexander Khinshtein, have become a walking meme and a symbol of helplessness and indifference from the country's leadership.
By the sixth month of the Kursk operation, the humanitarian crisis forced Russians to do something they would never have dared to do in any other situation – go to protests and demand something from the authorities, sometimes in an elevated tone.
And this is just a small part of the Kursk region, not entire areas with district centers and large industrial cities turned to ash, as in Ukraine. What if the scale of the Kursk operation were different? Or if there were more such control zones for the Defence Forces of Ukraine, not only in the Kursk region? What if another such zone could arise in the near future, bringing 150, 200, or even 250 thousand Russian refugees?
The Kursk operation clearly demonstrated Russia's helplessness in ensuring the security of its borders.
The Kursk operation clearly showed Russia’s inability to effectively fight even on its own territory and quickly regain control of areas occupied by the enemy, even with numerical superiority.
The Kursk operation clearly revealed Russia's inability to cope with unexpected humanitarian challenges, creating a chaotic effect and public, social discontent, something that Putin's Russia always feared most.
The Kursk operation has had and continues to have a serious impact, not only on Russian forces but also on internal processes within Russia. Therefore, one can only draw one conclusion from this – it needs to be repeated!
