If simplified as much as possible, in 2025 Trump tried to use the "carrot" approach to stop Moscow’s drift toward the North Korea–China–Iran triangle and prevent it from turning into a quadrilateral.
But the carrot in the form of Anchorage and partial sanctions relief did not work.
In principle, the Anchorage model was morally outdated already at the moment it was created.
The Anchorage model might have worked in 2022, but by 2026 it was perceived as an annoying anachronism.
Therefore, Trump will now try to achieve the strategic goal of the United States through the "stick" — a new wave of escalation.
The emerging goal appears to be the following: an economic crisis in Russia should lead to the failure of pro-Putin parties in the State Duma elections or even disrupt the elections altogether.
According to the Trump team’s concept, this could trigger a social crisis in Russia, followed by a political crisis, which would eventually lead to a reset of the Russian ruling elites and their "drift away from China." This is, of course, not about replacing "Putin with Shoigu," but the logic of the approach is clear.
The United States is attempting, through "kind words and a Colt," to break apart the quadrilateral of China–North Korea–Russia–Iran.
Paraphrasing a currently politically incorrect classic:
"The quadrilateral shall be consumed!
Whether it is a parallelepiped,
Whether it is a circle, damn it!"
But for us, and more broadly for analytical assessments of a "war of attrition," what matters is understanding the "vector of potential difference." And the potential difference, as a scalar quantity showing the work done by a field in moving a charge, is what creates that very "voltage."
From physics, we know that vector E shows the force with which a field pushes on a charge and the direction in which it will ultimately "fly."
Imagine a mountain: its height is the potential. The slope of the mountain is the intensity. The intensity vector shows the direction of the steepest descent from the mountain in order to reduce height/tension.
The difference in potential between Ukraine and Russia provides an answer to the question of when the "descent from the mountain" will begin — that is, when the war will come to an end.
For example, when will the "descent from the mountain" begin in Russia?
Before the full-scale war, a purely mathematical comparison of potentials in 2021 showed the following parameters:
- Population difference: 144 million versus 37 million people. A difference of 3.9 times;
- GDP difference: $2 trillion versus $200 billion. A difference of ten times;
- Mobilization potential difference: 20 million versus 5 million people. A difference of four times;
- Army size: 1.1 million versus 260,000 personnel. A difference of 4.2 times;
- Trained mobilization reserve: 2 million versus 900,000 people. A difference of two times.
However, all these figures provided very limited understanding of the full-scale war model, except for one fact: Ukraine’s available trained mobilization reserve, compared with other parameters, was the most effective factor and practically neutralized Russia’s numerical advantages in other areas during the initial stage of the war.
Simply put, thanks to a significant trained mobilization reserve, Ukraine was able to stop the blitzkrieg despite being inferior in such parameters as total population and GDP (which is exactly what happened in reality).
The smallest difference in potential between Ukraine and Russia at the beginning of the war was observed in the parameter of trained mobilization reserves.
At the same time, there was — and still is — no answer to the question of the time factor in the difference of potentials.
Simply put: when will Russia find itself in the position Ukraine was in during 2022?
During the period from 2022 to 2025, most Russians perceived the war as "something happening on television." The war was truly felt only by residents of border regions and by the first wave of mobilization, which involved 300,000 people.
What is the "feeling of war"? First and foremost, it is a "tactile" perception of war and a change in everyday life and the political environment.
It is when people spend nights in bomb shelters, borders are closed, political activity is put on hold, and restrictions are imposed on certain segments of the population.
In this context, Russians have only now begun to experience the tangible reality of war, facing everyday difficulties (for example, fuel shortages) that Ukrainians encountered as early as April 2022.
But this is still not the complete puzzle.
The full puzzle of the tangible experience of war will come together when Russia announces mobilization, closes its borders, and puts elections on hold.
When this happens, we will obtain the most important analytical indicator: the time dimension of the difference in potentials between Ukraine and Russia.
Most likely, Russia’s political regime and the nature of everyday life, adapted to wartime conditions, will be fully formed by 2027.
If this happens, we will learn the time indicator of the difference in potentials. It will likely be around five years. In that case, structural problems in Russia caused by the war would probably not begin before 2032.
This could create the possibility of a war strategy being developed by the Vance team during his first term (2028–2032), if he is elected, of course.
This also explains the change in his rhetoric.
Forecasts of the war ending within the 2028–2029 timeframe are based on estimates of a much longer time indicator of the difference in potentials between Ukraine and Russia (possibly assessed in Washington as 10 years or more), which would make the "stick" approach extremely difficult to implement.
However, a five-year difference in potentials strengthens the "stick" scenario and reduces the likelihood of the "carrot" approach.
The key factor here will be Russia’s mobilization and the transformation of Russian society’s way of life, as well as changes in the political regime affecting the ruling elites: whether this will happen in 2027 or not.
This also explains the apparent paradox: why Putin has still not announced mobilization in Russia (apart from the "one-time" mobilization in 2022, which was caused by the minimal gap in trained mobilization reserve parameters between Ukraine and Russia at the beginning of the war).
The answer is clear: such a move would create an extremely narrow time indicator of the difference in potentials between Ukraine and Russia and expose Russia’s vulnerability in a prolonged war.
Because the shorter the difference in potentials, the greater the financial and military support for Ukraine from the West — and vice versa.
