Executive Summary
The United States can use the enormous challenges Russia will face in 2025 as leverage to secure critical concessions in ongoing negotiations to end the war by continuing and even expanding military support to Ukraine. Russia will likely face a number of materiel, manpower, and economic issues in 12 to 18 months if Ukrainian forces continue to inflict damage on Russian forces on the battlefield at the current rate. Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) cannot sustain Russia's current armored vehicle, artillery system, and ammunition burn rates in the medium-term. Russia's recruitment efforts appear to be slowing such that they cannot indefinitely replace Russia's current casualty rates without an involuntary reserve mobilization, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown great reluctance to order. Putin has mismanaged Russia's economy, which is suffering from increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund. These issues will present difficult decision points to Putin in 2026 or 2027 provided current trends continue. Putin thus is likely prioritizing breaking Western and particularly US support to Ukraine in 2025 and securing his desired end state in negotiations, letting him avoid facing the nexus of difficult problems he now confronts. US military aid to Ukraine has let Ukraine drive Russia towards a critical moment when Putin will have to make hard choices. The United States can accelerate the moment when Putin must grapple with these interlocking problems and can likely coerce Russia into making the concessions on its demands necessary to secure a peace acceptable to the United States, Ukraine, and Europe. The United States can achieve a strong negotiating position and negotiate a deal that maximizes American interests by continuing military aid to Ukraine and increasing battlefield pressure on Russia.
Russia's Problems on the Horizon
Russia will likely face several materiel, manpower, and economic constraints in the coming months that will put pressure on the Kremlin's ability to maintain its war effort in Ukraine in the medium- to long-term — if Russian forces' loss rates in Ukraine continue at the current tempo.
Putin planned for Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine to last weeks — not years. Putin's false assumptions about Ukraine's ability and willingness to defend its territory led him not to prepare the Russian economy or military recruitment system for a protracted and expensive war with high losses. Putin has failed to make difficult but necessary decisions to create the systems necessary for sustaining a protracted war. Russia's protracted war and high losses on the battlefield are already causing major economic issues in Russia, and these economic problems will likely mature within another 12 to 18 months.
Russian forces have sustained vehicle and artillery system losses on the battlefield that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term given the limitations of Russia's defense industrial capacity and Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks.
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported in early February 2025 that Russia has lost (presumably damaged or destroyed) almost 10,000 tanks since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed or damaged 3,689 tanks, 8,956 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 13,050 artillery systems, and 407 air defense systems in 2024 alone. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) recently estimated that Ukrainian forces destroyed 1,400 Russian main battle tanks and over 3,700 Russian IFVs and armored personnel carriers (APCs) in 2024. (IISS's numbers likely differ from those from the Ukrainian General Staff as IISS data likely only accounts for destroyed vehicles.) Dutch open-source project Oryx, which uses photo or video evidence to verify Russian equipment losses, confirmed that Russia has lost at least 3,740 tanks, 5,459 IFVs, 615 APCs, 446 towed artillery systems, and 880 self-propelled artillery systems since February 2022 as of the time of this writing.
Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce new armored vehicles and artillery systems at rates that can offset Russia's current tempo of losses in the medium- to long-term. Russia is reportedly able to produce about 200 IFVs per year — far below even the more conservative figures for Russia's IFV losses in 2024. Russia is reportedly able to produce about 50 artillery gun barrels per year but is unable to quickly scale up this production as Russia currently only has two factories that are equipped with the specialized machines used to produce gun barrels. Russia has one factory producing new tanks — Uralvagonzavod in Nizhny Tagil. Estimates vary widely for the factory's production rates, ranging from about 20 tanks per month to just 60 to 90 per year. Uralvagonzavod can also reportedly refurbish about eight tanks per month, while three other repair plants can reportedly refurbish about 17 tanks per month each. Еven Uralvagonzavod's higher new production estimates plus Russia's reported refurbishment rates leave the Russian DIB unable to replace Russia's continued high tank losses.
Russia has maintained its offensives by tapping its Soviet-era stocks of armored vehicles and artillery systems to compensate for these high loss rates, but this resource is finite and approaching a point of diminishing availability. IISS assessed that Russia refurbished and built over 1,500 tanks and 2,800 IFVs and APCs in 2024 — suggesting that Russia produced enough vehicles to replace all of IISS's estimated tank losses and three quarters of IISS's assessed Russian armored vehicle losses in 2024. Other open-source assessments of Russian military depots using satellite imagery find that Russia retains 47 percent of its pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of its pre-war IFV reserves, and 45 percent of its pre-war APC reserves in storage as of December 2, 2024. Some analysts forecast that Russia will run out of its Soviet-era equipment stockpiles by the end of 2025 or in 2026. IISS also notably assessed that Russia may be suffering from a shortage of spare parts to refurbish tanks and armored vehicles. Significant portions of Russia’s Soviet-era tanks and armored vehicles remaining in long-term stores are likely the remains of cannibalized or unsalvageable hulls in deteriorated condition that cannot be used to offset the high equipment losses Russian could face in 2025 and beyond.
Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent months, likely in part due to heavy losses and the need to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle. ISW began observing indications in November and December 2024 that Russian forces were using fewer armored vehicles in Donetsk region, particularly in areas where Russian forces had previously relied heavily on mechanized assaults to make significant tactical advances. Ukrainian military officials have reported in recent months that Russian forces are fielding fewer armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — the two operational directions with the highest intensity of fighting and where Russia has the densest concentrations of its forces — in favor of highly attritional, infantry-led assaults.IISS noted in February 2025 that Russia has adapted some of its tactics to address ongoing equipment shortages and is increasingly relying on infantry-led assaults to advance along the frontline.
Russia's DIB may not be able to produce or procure enough artillery ammunition to support the current rate of Russian offensive operations in the medium- to long-term.
Russia cannot produce sufficient shells to meet its current operational needs despite the fact that Russia has increased its artillery production since the start of its full-scale invasion. CNN reported in March 2024 that NATO intelligence estimated that the Russian DIB was producing about 250,000 artillery shells per month. The Royal United Services Institute's (RUSI) and Open Source Center reported in October 2024 that Russian forces' rate of fire since June 2022 has been "fairly consistent" between 7,000 and 16,000 rounds per day, with an average of about 10,000 per day or about 300,000 per month — just over Russia's average production rate. Russia’s previous 5:1 artillery advantage ratio over Ukraine has been reduced to 1.5:1 as of December 2024 and will likely continue to decrease provided current trends continue
Russia has had to lean on allies and partners to satisfy Russia’s materiel requirements. Up to 60 percent of the artillery and mortar shells that Russian forces have been firing as of December 2024 have reportedly come from North Korea, which reportedly sent Russia as many as nine million shells — indicating that the Russian DIB was unable to sustain the required level of supplies on its own.It remains unclear if North Korean and other foreign provisions will be able to compensate for the Russian DIB's inadequacies indefinitely. North Korea reportedly increased its domestic production of 152mm shells in 2024, but the North Korean shells that Russian forces are currently firing are reportedly of a low quality, with about half of them proving to be duds.
Iran has supplied Russia with weapons, particularly Shahed drones, as Russian-Iranian relations have intensified since Russia's full-scale invasion. However, it is unclear if Iran would be willing or able to significantly increase its materiel supplies to Russia. The January 2025 Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement lacked a mutual defense clause, and Iranian officials noted at the time that the agreement is "not a military alliance" and differs from Russia's agreements with North Korea and Belarus — suggesting that Iran is unwilling to participate in Russia's war in Ukraine at a higher level on par with North Korea or Belarus. Iran also lacks the stockpiles or defense industrial capacity to provide Russia with much needed tanks, IFVs, APCs, artillery systems, or ammunition.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) has larger materiel stocks and could provide Russia with vehicles, artillery systems, and ammunition, but has so far refused to engage in such direct support. The PRC will likely continue to refuse to do so out of fear of triggering economic sanctions or decoupling from the West.
Russia's current force generation apparatus appears unable to recruit the manpower that the Russian military needs to sustain Russia's current rate of offensive operations.
Russia's current reported monthly recruitment rate is either just equal to or just below the quantity needed to replace Russia's monthly casualty rate one-to-one. Former US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reported in October 2024 that Russian forces were suffering roughly 1,200 casualties per day. UK Defense Secretary John Healey stated in November 2024 that Russian forces suffered an average daily casualty rate of 1,345 troops per day in October 2024. Russia's casualty rate increased in late 2024 as Russian forces made gradual, creeping advances in eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that December 2024 saw a record-high Russian loss rate with 48,670 casualties, even though Russian advances slowed in December 2024 compared to September through November 2024. Syrskyi reported in January 2025 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024. Similarly high casualty rates have continued into 2025, with Russia reportedly suffering 48,240 casualties in January 2025. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed in late December 2024 that 440,000 recruits signed military service contracts with the Russian MoD in 2024 — about 36,600 new recruits per month.
Several indicators suggest that the Russian recruitment rate has been declining. Russian regional authorities have engaged in a months-long campaign to increase the payments offered to new military recruits, suggesting that sign up rates were slowing and that Russia had to find new incentives to drive recruitment. The monetary rewards for signing up for military service are significantly higher in many Russian federal subjects than the average Russian salary, so ever greater financial incentives in the future are unlikely to dramatically increase recruitment, as a large portion of the pool of Russian citizens who are incentivized by money at levels the Russian state could afford to offer at scale have likely already volunteered to join the military. The Russian MoD is also taking steps to increase the pool of conscripts and volunteers who are eligible for military service, including a February 3 proposal to amend Russian legislation to reclassify some illnesses, diseases, and disorders as minor ailments that do not disqualify someone from service. Russia exhausted its prison population in 2022 and 2023 and is no longer able to generate significant forces from inmates. Russian officials have also reportedly pushed back against the high recruitment demands the Kremlin places on federal subjects. Sverdlovsk region Governor Yevgeny Kuyvashev reportedly lobbied in October 2024 for the Russian MoD to reduce the Sverdlovsk region recruiting quota, and regional industrialists and heads of defense industrial enterprises that are suffering from labor shortages reportedly supported Kuyvashev.
Russia's turn to North Korea for troops also suggests that Russia is struggling to recruit enough forces at home. Putin's decision to use foreign forces to liberate Russian territory demonstrates that Russia lacks the required quantity of personnel to sustain its priority operations in eastern Ukraine while also responding to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk region. North Korea has thus far sent too small a number of troops to make a meaningful difference in Russian force generation overall. The roughly 12,000 North Korean troops in Kursk region would offset nine to 12 days of theater-wide Russian losses at current rates.
