Simultaneous resolution of the issues with Korenevo and Glushkovsky districts puts Putin in an operational checkmate.
And it will be resolved, and I wouldn't be surprised if it's by the end of this week or the beginning of the next.
While Russian federal-level propaganda focuses entirely on advancing Russian troops in the Toretsk-Pokrovsk direction and the visit of the war criminal Putin, who is wanted by the ICC, to Azerbaijan, local "war correspondents" and "military bloggers" not close to the inner circle are ringing alarm bells about the crisis in Kursk. And they are right to do so.
Convenient and nearest logistics to Belgorod region are not functioning. Logistics in Kursk region is suffering in terms of operational efficiency due to fire control by Ukrainian forces over the main routes. The entire Glushkovsky district has become isolated, and pontoons will not solve the problem, especially since they are more vulnerable than stationary bridges, and their throughput capacity is still lower. The Russian grouping in Glushkovsky district, I won’t say how many personnel there are, as only General Syrskyi knows for sure, and he won’t say, is in a position with a limited time to cross to the northern bank of the Seym River. Instead of promptly withdrawing this grouping, the command is trying to provide them with supplies and reinforcements.
Attempts to distract Russian attention to various peripheral issues are seriously irritating some of the speakers on their propaganda platforms.
However, considering the prospects of the coming days and the resolution of various issues, it is clear that Ukrainian forces are opening a path to Rylsk. One does not need to be a genius to see the possibility of cutting off a logistical node when the south, southwest, and southeast are covered and only 15 kilometers remain to the node. There is no need for a city assault with urban battles; fire control from a distance is sufficient. Though, I should note that Rylsk is divided by the Seym River into two parts, with only two connecting bridges, which has its own implications.
I am confident that by September 6, exactly one month from the start of the Kursk operation, the area controlled by Ukrainian forces in Kursk region will increase to 2,000 square kilometers, covering a significantly larger operational area.
By that time, battles for Pokrovsk may not even have started. And if they have, they won’t have reached their climax yet.
What will Putin choose between? I am sure he will make the anticipated predatory bet on Pokrovsk, which smells of even greater losses in Kursk region, disproportionate to the "gains" that Russian forces have made since the beginning of 2024.
When I described the strategy of Ukrainian forces for 2024 in December 2023, I noted that it would be defensive, with rare offensive actions, focusing more on depleting the enemy rather than liberating and holding territories. For every Ukrainian soldier lost, 7-10 occupiers are eliminated. For every one of our tanks, 4-5 of theirs are destroyed, and more. And until August 6, this strategy was working in the area of operations. Since August 6, a completely different exchange has begun, which has been a complete surprise to everyone.
For every square kilometer of our land captured by the enemy – 2, 3, 4, 10 square kilometers of Russian land are captured in return. For every 2-3 kilometers of enemy advance into our territory in a week, Ukrainian forces advance 2-3 kilometers into Russian territory per day.
The Russian army might be able to stretch the exchange of losses in 2024, but not the territorial one.
