European NATO countries must radically shift their defense planning and Russia deterrence priorities, moving away from a narrow focus on regional scenarios and toward a broader understanding of the global strategic context, analysts from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) argue.
The experts emphasize that rebalancing the alliance amid a potential reduction in the US military presence should not be reduced to a simple mechanical replacement of American capabilities with equivalent European resources.
The key challenge, according to RUSI, is that a hypothetical large-scale crisis or direct war between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region would fundamentally alter the conditions under which Europe would have to deter Russia.
At present, European public discussions and military planning are dominated by the scenario of a limited Russian seizure of territory in the Baltic states, followed by the need to retake those areas. Existing estimates suggest that countering such a breakthrough would require the deployment of up to 300,000 additional troops and 1,400 tanks to NATO’s eastern flank.
However, RUSI analysts warn that focusing exclusively on this scenario risks preparing for the “wrong war.”
In the event of a US–China conflict, Russia may see not merely an opportunity for a limited territorial grab, but a rare historic window to fundamentally reshape the European order in its favor — requiring an operation on a completely different scale.
The Kremlin could also decide that launching a war in Europe is less advantageous than using its key assets — including attack submarines and missile systems — to support a Chinese victory in the Pacific, with the expectation of later resolving European issues on Moscow’s terms.
In response, RUSI analysts urge European countries to reconsider their military priorities and redirect resources away from purely local territorial defense toward a strategy of managing risks and imposing costs across the entire theater of operations.
According to Russian military strategists, including General S. Sterlin and Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov, a regional war would not remain local. Its outcome would be determined by strikes against infrastructure, logistics networks, intelligence and command systems deep inside enemy territory, as well as by the early use of non-strategic nuclear weapons and the destruction of cruise missile carriers at the outset of a conflict.
Under such conditions, air and missile defense systems, nuclear-powered attack submarines, and long-range precision strike capabilities become critically important.
RUSI experts argue that Europe’s development of deep-strike capabilities would be significantly cheaper than maintaining large armored formations. For example, Australia’s purchase of 220 Tomahawk missiles for $833 million is comparable to the annual cost of maintaining a single armored brigade, estimated at around $600 million.
At the same time, Russia’s industrial base is located only a few hundred kilometers from the borders of Finland and Ukraine, while strategic infrastructure elements such as the Rezonans-NE radar system in the Far North remain vulnerable to precision strikes.
By increasing naval readiness, creating a threat to Russia’s Northern Fleet to limit the redeployment of its submarines eastward, and gaining the ability to strike critical targets deep behind enemy lines, Europe could force Moscow to maintain significant forces in the west and question the predictability of escalation.
According to RUSI analysts, NATO’s primary objective in Europe should not be the guaranteed defeat of Russian forces along the frontline, but the creation of such a level of uncertainty and risk that neutrality would appear to the Kremlin as a safer option than launching a large-scale war.
