Russia's ambitious programme to build icebreakers for advancing the Northern Sea Route project is unlikely to come to fruition in the near future. Long-standing problems at their shipyards, combined with Western sanctions, cast doubt on Russia's ability to dominate Arctic waters. These conclusions were made by researcher Paul Goble from the Jamestown Foundation.
Russia boasts the most icebreakers globally, a fact it takes pride in, claiming it ensures dominance over the Arctic. However, the majority of these icebreakers are small, diesel-powered, and lack the advanced electronics and capabilities required for full-scale operations in the open sea. This means they are effective mainly in ports, not in the more challenging waters of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), particularly in its Eastern Arctic portion. Here, the situation is worsened by the cooling trend in recent years, reversing the warming effects seen earlier due to climate change, which has led to an increase in ice cover (The Barents Observer, August 6; AANII, August 8). As a result, Russia's ability to keep the NSR operational year-round remains in jeopardy, and the situation is especially dire in the Eastern Arctic, which is becoming more difficult to navigate.
Moscow’s struggles with a shortage of deep-sea icebreakers are becoming increasingly apparent. The Russian government has announced plans for a large-scale icebreaker construction programme, but experts have acknowledged that this will take time and may not materialize in the near future. Additionally, Vice Admiral Oleg Golubyov, Deputy Commander of Russia’s Northern Fleet, recently admitted that Russian ships in the eastern Arctic often must drift at night to avoid sea ice or the risk of running aground in poorly surveyed areas. This lack of adequate icebreaker escorts means ships can only move during daylight hours, when helicopters can survey a safe route forward (IAREX.ru, March 31; Profile.ru, November 9). Such a safety risk was notably underscored in 2021, when numerous ships, both civilian and military, were trapped in the ice for weeks (The Barents Observer, November 9, 2021). This highlights the severe limitations of Russia's current icebreaking capabilities.
Golubyov's remarks highlight deeper, often overlooked issues related to Russia's icebreaking fleet and the Arctic region as a whole. In an interview with the Northern Fleet's newspaper, Na Strazhe Zapolyarya, Golubyov revealed that this year, Russian ships encountered heavy sea ice between Wrangel Island and the Russian mainland, extending toward the Bering Strait. Without icebreaker support, the ships had to drift overnight and rely on helicopters to clear a path by day. Golubyov stressed that this makeshift arrangement is not sustainable and that Russia is striving to overcome these challenges through the construction of more icebreakers, even though global warming may render such efforts unnecessary in the long run. Compounding these problems, the region remains largely unmapped, with shallow waters that can trap ice, presenting additional dangers to vessels.
Environmental concerns in the Eastern Arctic have long been overshadowed by global warming, which has left the Western half of the NSR ice-free for much of the year. However, in the Eastern Arctic, temperatures have cooled, and ice coverage has increased, exacerbating the challenges of keeping the NSR open for trade with China and maintaining Russia’s claims over the Arctic seabed, which is rich in natural resources (Profile.ru, May 31, 2022; The Barents Observer, November 16, 2022). To address these issues, Russia has outlined an ambitious plan to construct more icebreakers and ice-capable ships, hoping to ensure uninterrupted trade and expand its geopolitical influence. However, Russia's shipbuilding sector is plagued by corruption, sanctions, and funding cuts, particularly due to the ongoing war in Ukraine, making it highly unlikely that the country will meet the necessary targets for building the required number of vessels (Kommersant, October 12, 2023; EDM, December 12, 2023).
This situation has created a new geo-economic and geopolitical reality in the Arctic. While Russia still holds a dominant position in terms of the number of icebreakers it possesses, this dominance is increasingly superficial. Golubyov's comments reveal that many of Russia's icebreakers are ill-equipped for the harsh conditions of the open sea, making them better suited for port operations than for maintaining critical shipping lanes through the NSR. Furthermore, Moscow is facing growing pressure to secure the Eastern Arctic, where ice is thickening, and to maintain its claims to the mineral-rich seabed, which would be essential for its broader geopolitical and economic ambitions (see EDM, October 29, 2019).
Other countries, including Canada, Finland, the United States, and China, have taken notice of Russia's icebreaker limitations and are working to expand their own fleets. They recognize that Russia's aging vessels are being kept in service long beyond their prime, and the country is struggling to meet deadlines for constructing new icebreakers. This loss of Russian dominance, once a source of intimidation for other Arctic nations, is becoming more evident (The Barents Observer, July 10, 2023). China, in particular, has been making strides in building icebreakers at a faster pace than its counterparts, and its recent investments in this area could soon give it a stronger foothold in the Arctic. Given China's growing interest in Russia's use of the NSR, Moscow is increasingly concerned that Beijing could take a more dominant role in the Arctic region, diminishing Russia's influence (EDM, July 23, 2020).
In light of these developments, Russia's inability to reliably navigate the Eastern Arctic waters marks the beginning of a major shift in Arctic geopolitics. If Western nations do not act soon to expand their own icebreaker fleets, they will soon find themselves in a position where they must deal with China’s increasing dominance in the region. This shift is likely to reshape the power dynamics in the Arctic, with far-reaching consequences for Russia’s Arctic strategy.
