By Yevhen Magda, Political scientist and lecturer, Director of the "Institute of World Policy" for LIGA.net
Increased activity by Belarusian military forces near the Ukrainian border has prompted a diplomatic rebuke from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ukrainian diplomats have advised their Belarusian neighbors to disregard Russian orders and cease unfriendly actions.
The statement from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs notably avoided any mention of Alexander Lukashenko's role in the Belarusian government, where he has been in power for over 30 years. This omission is a political decision, but events in Belarus are likely to develop in the context of the upcoming presidential elections in a country that does not hide its status as a Russian satellite.
The organization of former Belarusian security officers, BELPOL, has reported that Lukashenko’s team plans to hold presidential elections on February 23, 2025. Changing the election date is not new for Lukashenko, who treats the country’s legislation as if it were a toy. The last week of February is chosen deliberately, as February 23 is celebrated as the Red Army Day in Belarus, in conjunction with Russia. However, this is not the only reason.
It is important to understand that the upcoming presidential elections in Belarus will significantly differ from the 2020 campaign, which was marked by factors such as the activation of civil society in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Kremlin’s interest in unsettling Lukashenko by introducing and supporting various candidates. Since then, Putin has transferred the title of the "last dictator of Europe" to Lukashenko through a few actions, focusing instead on being a major instigator of the largest war in the modern world. The Russo-Ukrainian war near the Belarusian border is a significant factor in potential destabilization, but Lukashenko’s police apparatus intends to manage it through showy arrests and court trials of minimally disloyal citizens. It should be noted that there are currently several hundred thousand Belarusians abroad who maintain contact with relatives and friends within the country, but it is difficult to envision a catalyst for new protests. The large number of political prisoners, draconian legislation, and strong Russian-Belarusian propaganda prevent Lukashenko’s opponents from raising their heads inside the country.
Therefore, it is highly doubtful that in the coming months Belarus will see candidates capable of challenging Lukashenko. Leaders of Belarusian democratic forces have in their passive records judgments of imprisonment for several presidential terms, making their return to Belarus impossible. Statist candidates may appear in the elections, but they are unlikely to play a decisive role. The replacement of Lydia Yermoshina as the head of the Central Election Commission with Igor Karpenko is symbolic and will not lead to an unexpected democratization of the electoral process.
Let’s also consider the seasonal factor. The December 2010 event, when security forces detained seven former presidential candidates, happened in December. Since then, Lukashenko’s regime has significantly strengthened technically. Water cannons and other special equipment, controlled personally by loyal security forces, could serve as a warning factor at the end of winter. Belarusian society has too little experience in creating civil resistance organizations (although there is some) to expect an easy victory over the regime.
The desire to conduct the presidential campaign as quickly as possible is also explained by the attempt to avoid the negative impact of Russia on the Belarusian economy. Belarusian enterprises are currently eager to fulfill Russian orders, supply regular and aviation fuel, and demonstrate their readiness to be allies of the Kremlin. However, there is a difference between profiting from the war and directly participating in it.
How realistic is the factor of a "small victorious war" in Lukashenko’s upcoming campaign? He must understand that Belarusian bellicosity has not increased since February 24, 2022, and despite bravura statements about arming the population, there has been no increase in additional combat skills among the military or self-sacrifice among the population. By the way, the Russians have "brotherly" removed equipment and ammunition from Belarus over these 900 days. While Belarusians are known for their partisan experience from World War II, in recent years they have tried to position themselves as an "IT nation." Significant provocation is needed to stimulate activity in this area, and those interested in the Belarusian agenda understand this.
However, another important deterrent factor is the possibility of a special forces raid to capture the Chernobyl and/or Rivne Nuclear Power Plants. The Kremlin is noticeably nervous about the approach of Ukrainian units to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant and will likely attempt to gain additional leverage over the international community. The use of "nuclear arguments" is a tested method, and Lukashenko is a proven partner.
There is also another significant deterrent factor regarding the large-scale activation of the Belarusian army: several strategic objects of Belarusian industry are within the reach of Ukrainian artillery and UAVs. The current deterrent is the lack of a state of war; otherwise, both the Mozyr and Novopolotsk refineries and machinery enterprises would be in trouble. This, along with the potential loss of Belarusian soldiers in combat, is unlikely to strengthen Lukashenko’s position. The Kremlin is pushing him toward war with Ukraine with the clear goal of obtaining an even more manageable leader in Minsk. Is this possible? Quite so. Lukashenko appears noticeably tired from the constant pressure from Moscow, and accelerating the presidential election process looks like a high-stakes gamble.
At the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, one of the main platforms for the invasion was Belarusian territory. I repeatedly warned that the involvement of Belarusian troops in the war would be a tragedy for many Belarusian families and would severely damage Belarusian-Ukrainian relations. They are still far from ideal, more smoldering than developing, which only underscores the need for democratization in Belarus. Unfortunately, the key to changes in Belarus lies with the Kremlin.
What should Belarus's neighbors do in this situation? First of all, they need to intensify cooperation within the Lublin Triangle and coordinate their positions. Belarusian democratic forces dispersed across various countries will need to consolidate to protect the interests of their homeland. We must monitor Lukashenko’s rhetoric and wardrobe: the more militaristic his style, the greater the chances of negative developments. We must understand that direct Belarusian involvement in the war against Ukraine would turn the country into a "Russian balcony" in the center of Europe with all the negative consequences.
