On the eve of the parliamentary elections in Armenia (7 June), Russia has significantly intensified political, informational, and economic pressure on Yerevan. For the Kremlin, the desired scenario is a complete change of power through the electoral defeat of the current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The minimum goal for Moscow is fragmentation of the future parliament and depriving the pro-European party “Civil Contract” of the ability to independently make foreign policy and security decisions.
Russia’s strategy of influencing the electoral process is coordinated through the Directorate for Strategic Cooperation and Partnership of the Russian presidential administration and includes several interconnected components that have been developed over years.
First is economic pressure on the country. At the end of May, Russia introduced a number of restrictions on imports of Armenian goods, including vegetables, flowers, mineral water, as well as cognac and wines from certain producers. Formally, Moscow traditionally justifies these measures as “phytosanitary violations” and concern for product safety, using trade as a tool of political coercion.
There is also support for a “fifth column.” The Kremlin seeks to consolidate votes around several opposition projects: the “Strong Armenia” party of S. Karapetyan, the “Armenia” bloc of R. Kocharyan, “Prosperous Armenia” of G. Tsarukyan, and political projects linked to A. Tatoyan. In practice, this is expressed through large-scale media promotion of opposition forces and discrediting Nikol Pashinyan through Russian and pro-Russian resources. The plan to discredit the current government includes increasing activity on Facebook, TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube, with the aim of reaching 2.5–3 million daily content views.
Measures are also planned to mobilize the Armenian diaspora in Russia for electoral purposes. This includes organizing the travel of citizens of Armenian origin living in Russia to Armenia to participate in voting. The potential scale of the operation is estimated at 100,000 “additional” voters, with a cost of about 50 million USD.
Finally, Russia is also using disinformation networks and “false flag” information operations. The campaign against Pashinyan involves Russian propaganda infrastructure linked to the “Social Design Agency” and the “Storm-1516” network (a structure of the GRU of the Russian General Staff). The launch of a new media resource, “Yerevan1,” for the Armenian diaspora in Russia is also being considered. Its goal is to systematically foster negative attitudes toward the current Armenian government and promote the narrative that an alliance with Russia is “without alternative.”
