At the moment, the greatest threat to the situation in the entire southeastern "corner" of the front is the breakthrough by Russian forces specifically south of Pokrovsk (which we can, with some stretch, refer to as operational-tactical).
As a result, it is obvious that the Russian command has gained the ability to organize and carry out further offensive actions (with a fairly high chance of success), both towards the city of Pokrovsk itself and the deep encirclement of the left flank of our grouping, which continues to carry out combat operations in the remnants of the Kurakhivska salient.
The question is whether the Russian forces’ plan (strategy) for the winter campaign of 2025 includes an operation to capture Pokrovsk, or whether the Russian command will try to "re-capture" during the winter of 2025 towns such as Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, Vovchansk, or attempt to do this with respect to Kupiansk, or if they will attempt this simultaneously on several fronts. At this point, there is no clear answer.
Each of these "options" has a number of its own peculiarities (both individually and in the case of an attempt to carry them out "in tandem"). Currently, it is clear that the primary focus of Russian command is on the Pokrovsk area.
The real capabilities of the Russian forces to carry out more or less deep (at least operational-level) offensive operations currently appear quite questionable (I have limited data to assess them on each operational direction). However, it is clear that these capabilities are uneven, which has already led to the scale and scope of the so-called "strategic offensive" being reduced to an offensive along a narrow circle of operational directions (essentially, on two).
