By Kyrylo Sazonov
The massive nighttime attack of missiles and drones on Kyiv leaves us with the main and perfectly logical question: why? What is the military purpose of such operations? This is not the first time the enemy has launched everything it can at the Ukrainian capital and gained no advantage on the front as a result. Moreover, these attacks do not break the spirit of Ukrainian resistance — quite the opposite. They mobilize and unite civilians and the military, who had been arguing fiercely with each other on social media beforehand. And the cost of such raids is extremely high. So what’s the point?
And it’s not just about Kyiv. Constant strikes on frontline cities like Kramatorsk, Zaporizhzhia, or Pavlohrad are at least somewhat explainable: military logistics, supply hubs, and so on. But Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Dnipro — no assault on them or nearby battles are planned anytime soon. Why spend so many resources on striking these cities? Especially during war, when the question of efficient resource use is more critical than ever.
For comparison, on this same night Ukraine also carried out several very powerful strikes on the enemy’s rear. But in those cases the military logic is absolute. Novorossiysk — a hit on an oil terminal and an ammunition depot storing missiles. We paralyze Russia’s oil product trade, weakening their economy. The missiles that exploded in the depot will no longer fly toward Ukraine. Strikes on Crimea — exclusively military targets. Strikes on Donetsk — military and energy infrastructure. A very important logistical hub near the front, a place where equipment is based, repaired, and ammunition is stored. Absolute military logic in every strike. The goals and objectives are clear. But Russian bombings of our major cities — what is the logic there?
Talking about psychological effects makes no sense either. We will not break after a shelling and we will not run to demand from Zelensky a peace deal at any cost, even capitulation. If anything, the opposite is true. Yes, there are whiners and capitulationists, but they are such a small minority that they’re afraid to open their mouths. Another important point: it’s no secret that at the beginning of the war, a significant number of people believed that it was possible — even necessary — to make a deal with Russia. That they could be understood, that they were allegedly afraid of NATO expansion, that we provoked them, and so on. In other words, there was a percentage of people who “understood Russia.” They could have become the main support base for Russian propaganda. But with every strike on peaceful cities, there are fewer and fewer such “believers.” Does Russia not need them?
Perhaps the answer lies in this last question. People are not needed. People get in the way. They still talk about “denazification,” but Russian propaganda no longer mentions “liberating Ukraine from mythical nationalists.” They have realized that regardless of region or everyday language, the occupiers see no “their own” here. Everyone here is an outsider, hostile to them. And there is no place for Ukrainian citizens in their future architecture. Those who wanted to betray Ukraine have already done so. Only enemies remain.
Such statements are now being voiced openly on Russian broadcasts. And such appeals are being addressed to Ukraine’s population: Leave. Run. Make it so that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have no one left to defend here. Make room for the Horde. Loyalty to the occupiers no longer means waiting for them with a portrait of Putin under your pillow — it means leaving. A loyal Ukraine, Belarus-style, didn’t work out for them. A conquered Ukraine, like one big Mariupol, also isn’t working. Now they are willing to settle for an uninhabited Ukraine.
It seems to me that it might even be easier to fight them this way. Without masks…
