By Alexander Kovalenko for OBOZ
Russia is preparing to fight in 2025 with a large number of personnel. We must also prepare for this, adapting our tactics of combat to the enemy's constant infantry assaults. As part of finding a solution to this issue, I have begun publishing a series of materials dedicated to increasing enemy casualties, and the situation at the Pokrovsk-Kurakhiv direction led to the consideration of hypertrophied defense.
Ukraine's task now is to accumulate as many resources as possible for entering a new phase of the war, for which we may be unprepared at the moment of its escalation, if we do not prepare adequately.
Yesterday's events.
At the end of May 2023, in the Zaporizhzhia region, Ukraine’s Defense Forces began the counteroffensive that had been widely discussed and awaited, but its results were underestimated by many. However, the most important thing is that virtually no conclusions were drawn from this counteroffensive in terms of defense.
One could debate the effects of the counteroffensive in the Zaporizhzhia region last summer, but one thing is indisputable: we encountered hypertrophied defense for the first time, which the Russian forces had prepared during their occupation of these territories. The enemy not only dug in and entrenched themselves, but they created a fortified system, not only by the square but even by the cubic kilometer of terrain, and the number of obstacles in the supply zone was extraordinarily high.
In the supply zone (the first line of defense), on certain sections, five mines were placed per square meter — four antipersonnel mines and one anti-tank mine, arranged in a checkerboard pattern. Breaking through such areas was incredibly difficult, even with demining equipment and vehicles with mine-clearing devices, because a landing from vehicles, even with cleared paths, ended in personnel losses beyond the designated zones.
It was precisely this hypertrophied defense that needed to be prepared between the second half of 2023 and 2024 on the directions where the Russian forces were most active and where it was clear that they would not stop. However, even where defense lines and positions were prepared, they followed a classic, textbook format with no deviation from regulations. And the standard fortifications now fail to deliver the necessary effect of stalling the enemy's troops, which is essential for increasing the enemy's exhaustion through maximizing casualties. Especially given the increasing use of infantry by the Russian forces as the main force in combat.
In this regard, when discussing hypertrophied defense, I would first like to focus on the antipersonnel component, which can reduce the enemy's offensive pace, disrupt their assault, and increase their casualties.
Antipersonnel Obstacles
In my September article, I noted that one of Ukraine's catastrophic mistakes in the past was the signing and ratification of the Ottawa Convention, which prohibits the use of antipersonnel mines as a means of warfare. As a result, Ukraine, the fifth largest country in the world by antipersonnel mine stockpiles, destroyed millions of PMN, PFМ-1, and other types of mines.
However, such antipersonnel obstacles have always been, and are now especially, highly relevant. Unfortunately, we cannot use them, although the U.S. is not a signatory to the convention and could supply us with the necessary components, as the U.S. Army has more than enough stockpiled.
But if antipersonnel mines cannot be used, another important element is antipersonnel obstacles, particularly of the wire type.
Some of the most effective include wire nets with three rows of stakes and wire loosely stretched between them, reinforced wire fences on tripods, trestles, and frames. In some cases, tripwires and other explosive traps can be set on these obstacles.
On average, such obstacles are 6-8 meters wide and are placed 50 meters from a position or trench.
Under current conditions, wire obstacles will play an important role in field battles, but the standards for their placement must be fundamentally reconsidered. If attention needs to be focused on suppressing infantry assaults in field conditions, it is necessary to factor in the average range of mortar fire, particularly from a company-platoon level, with an emphasis on the 60mm caliber.
In my previous article on battalion artillery, I mentioned that mortars will play one of the most important roles in counteracting the excessive human resource of the Russian forces, and all calibers are equally important. Ignoring or underestimating 60mm mortars is simply unacceptable. Therefore, when considering the average firing range of a 60mm mortar, the placement of the first line of wire obstacles should be calculated accordingly.
Thus, it could be placed 800-1000 meters from the position itself. The distribution of such lines across the depth of the defense should be calculated within 100-150 meters. Some might argue that this is an excessive concentration of wire obstacles in such an area, and that’s true, but we are talking about hypertrophied defense, not what is outlined in textbooks.
Such placement will allow the enemy, in the case of a breakthrough, to fill a 100-meter section with their mass and find themselves in a constrained space, which will simplify targeting. Encountering obstacles every 100-150 meters, they will be slowed down and neutralized. Ideally, with antipersonnel mines in place, they would also suffer additional casualties, aside from the fire damage from a wide range of weaponry—from 60mm mortars and FPV drones to both towed and rocket artillery. Especially since it is in these conditions that our often-neglected reactive artillery reveals its potential.
The hypertrophied approach to placing wire obstacles significantly mitigates the effect of the enemy's "meat assaults," progressively closing their groups into confined spaces that turn into slaughterhouses for their personnel.
When placing such obstacles, it should also be taken into account that, in field conditions, they may be breached by wheeled and tracked vehicles. Although wire can be hazardous even to tanks, entangling in their tracks, anti-tank minefields are a necessary element in the overall antipersonnel obstacle setup. And since we’re talking about equipment, let’s continue this discussion by addressing countermeasures against this component.
Defense Along Roads
Currently, a common tactic used by Russian forces is not so much direct mechanized breakthroughs of the Ukrainian Defense Forces' lines, although these are still relatively frequent, but rather the transportation of airborne troops via vehicles, their deployment, and then infantry taking over, often without the support of armored fighting vehicles. Of course, almost always, this transport occurs along roads, which, as shown by numerous videos from the combat zone, are inadequately equipped to counter such breakthroughs.
Hypertrophied road defense will be an essential component of future resistance to Russia’s dominance in human resources, because means of transporting personnel, regardless of their functionality, will still travel along paved or dirt roads.
Most roads in combat zones are straight and located in flat terrain, which allows enemy vehicles to reach maximum speed. A vivid example of this is the recent assault on the village of Shakhtarsk, which is now under occupation. This village serves as a litmus test of what could have happened with hypertrophied road defenses and what actually occurred as a result of following classic methods and attempts to justify the final result—the loss of the village in just two days.
The road leading to the village of Shakhtarsk from Zolota Nyva is 6.5 kilometers long. Let’s take this as the basis for examining how it could have been transformed into an impassable hell for Russian forces (ROV).
First Step – Placing dragon’s teeth (tank obstacles) every 500 meters. Not just placing them and leaving them there, but according to the rules of installation, linking them together with rebar or steel chains. Such placement would prevent ROV from accelerating their vehicles to full speed.
Second Step – Installing anti-tank mines within a 250-meter zone in a checkerboard pattern, using 14-21 TM-62 mines. This would also prevent ROV vehicles from moving quickly along the road, destroy their vehicles and personnel, slow down the column, and give the Ukrainian Defense Forces more time to react and target the column.
Third Step – Mining the bypasses at the locations of the tank obstacles. If the column attempted to bypass the obstacles on the right or left shoulder of the road, they would run into minefields, with each destroyed unit creating an additional obstacle for the enemy. Not to mention the personnel losses.
Such obstacles would significantly stretch the process of the enemy’s approach to the village, and their assault would not start within two days but only two weeks after the first attempt by the occupiers to travel along the road. During this time, not just dozens, but hundreds of enemy vehicles and just as many personnel would be lost.
Of course, the aim is not to say that all roads should be equipped with obstacles in this way, but rather to focus on the roads that the Russian troops will be able to use in the near future, which highlights the importance of planning and forecasting. But this is another topic, as is the fact that along such logistical routes, not only mines with tank obstacles and FPV drones should be deployed but a full spectrum of strike capabilities—comprehensively.
Of course, I’m not revealing some secret knowledge hidden behind seven locks; I’m merely exaggerating everyday knowledge by seven times. But in the current conditions, this is how it should look, and this is exactly what our enemy did in Zaporizhzhia region back in 2023.
Conclusions
Right now, in the area of active combat, especially in the Pokrovsk-Kurakhovo direction, we are witnessing the first phase of the Russian army transitioning into a marching battalion state. The excessive number of personnel and insufficient military equipment are preventing the Russian forces (ROV) from effectively and evenly deploying mechanized units, which is leading to the dominance of manpower.
In the future, the use of military equipment will be limited to specific functions, such as troop transportation and airborne assaults, but this stage has not yet been reached. However, the appropriate types of anti-personnel obstacles and equipment-blocking measures should already be considered, especially in a hypertrophied (overemphasized) form.
Hypertrophied defense should become a priority, no matter how much some people wish to rely on classic defenses, which have long outlived their usefulness and, in some cases, simply no longer justify themselves.
While the slow, bureaucratized state apparatus is (hopefully) moving forward, this issue should be considered by volunteers and public figures. Collecting funds for drones and vehicles is important, but strangely, I can’t recall a single fundraising effort for 10 kilometers of barbed wire. Can you?
The same responsibility lies with public figures, media personalities, and the expert community. Praising drone operators and tank crews is a good thing, but the minimal mention of battalion artillery, the need to saturate the front with mortars, light reactive artillery, minefields, anti-personnel fortifications, and so on, is simply unacceptable in such a complicated phase of the war.
Ukraine’s task now is to gather as many resources as possible for entering the next phase of the war, to which we may not be fully prepared when the moment of its catalyzation arrives.
