By Alexander Kovalenko for OBOZ
After a year of possible ceasefire, Russia will significantly increase its military potential. However, this poses a new threat not only to Ukraine but to other European countries as well. The potential of the Russian Forces after one year.
I analyzed how much stronger the Russian forces would become if they had a year without active combat.
Thanks to this "breather" and the inertia of the remnants of Soviet military-industrial legacy, Russia will be able to accumulate significant military-technical and human resources.
For example, the ROF will have the following potential in terms of equipment (mostly restored from stockpiles, depleting them to zero):
- Tanks – up to 4,500 units (in 2022, ROF had 3,200 units);
- Armored vehicles – up to 9-10 thousand units;
- Artillery systems – up to 5,000 guns.
Regarding missiles:
- X-101/555 – from 800 to 1,000;
- 3M14 Caliber cruise missiles – from 300 to 400;
- 9M723 Iskander OTRK – from 250 to 350;
- X-47M2 Kinzhal – 50-70;
- 3M22 Zircon – 15-20.
As for ammunition, taking into account both domestic production (2.5 million shots per year) and supplies from Iran and especially North Korea:
- Over 10 million shots of all calibers.
The human resource, assuming no monthly losses and the continuation of current mobilization levels, will allow the formation of an infantry component in the Russian army of 1.1 to 1.2 million people. If North Korean units continue to be sent to Russia, there could be a buildup of 50,000 North Korean personnel, which corresponds to the possibility of forming a separate North Korean ground forces army within the Russian forces.
This is roughly the kind of potential Russia will have after a year of "ceasefire," "end of fire," or however you want to call it—the accumulation will far exceed what the Russian forces had on February 24, 2022.
And the question arises: which world leaders can guarantee that, after a year of such a "ceasefire," Vladimir Putin, seeing his army's potential far exceeding what it was in 2022, won't want to repeat the "movement"? Not only in Ukraine, but also strike at Europe?
Let’s consider one of these potential scenarios.
Invasion of Europe
When we talk about the possible invasion of Russia into Europe, the first thing that comes to mind is the breakthrough through the Suwalki Corridor into the Kaliningrad region of Russia. And not many talk about it, but such a plan existed for the Russian army in 2022, when the Kremlin seriously considered ending the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible.
In 2022, I published an article titled "Russia’s Invasion of NATO Countries – A Short-Term Prospect," in which I noted that Ukraine thwarted Moscow's plans to invade Europe.
Russia planned, after occupying southeastern Ukraine and the Odessa region, to briefly pause, then invade Moldova, and later intensify operations in the Baltic Sea with a breakthrough into Kaliningrad through the Suwalki Corridor.
The Suwalki Corridor, when measured in a straight line, is about 70 km from the Belarusian border to the Kaliningrad region of Russia. But no one advances in a straight line, and breakthroughs will occur along highways, which could extend up to 100 km.
Moscow seriously considered a rapid march from Grodno and Lida toward Alytus and Mariupol, aiming to break through Vilkaviskis to the Kaliningrad region. The entire operation to establish a land corridor was planned to take 48 hours, with the remaining time allocated for securing positions, forming flanks, and expanding the safety zone.
However, the first months of the war in Ukraine depleted the potential of the Russian Forces, completely crushing Putin’s hopes of seizing the former Soviet republics—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and parts of Poland.
Now, with an offensive potential 2-3 times greater and a human resource potential 6 (!!!) times larger than in 2022, Vladimir Putin is unlikely to shy away from dusting off his European invasion plan and making it a reality.
For example, from the potential outlined above, the Russian forces could allocate 100,000 personnel to "cut through" the Suwalki Corridor without causing significant damage to its army. The offensive potential in terms of equipment could include 500 tanks, 1,500 armored vehicles, and about 1,000 artillery systems.
The corridor would be "cut through" in the shortest time possible, and Poland would not be able to effectively prevent this. Here's why:
Firstly, Poland is not prepared to counter such a form of assault at "any cost," with complete disregard for human lives, something the Russian army is accustomed to, as it holds a significant numerical advantage over the Polish armed forces.
Secondly, there are defensive lines and fortifications near the Belarusian border and the Kaliningrad region, but deeper into Polish territory—there are none. And I specifically used the phrase "something similar" for a reason.
Thirdly, the invasion by Russian forces would create a refugee wave, with people fleeing along major highways and local roads. This would cause massive traffic jams on routes like E-67, 653, 655, 16, and others, hindering the timely deployment of forces and resources. However, the mechanized columns of the Russian forces would not be stopped, as they would push through and fire on anything in their way along Route 651 and beyond.
Thus, by the time NATO can make any decisive move, the Suwalki Corridor will be "cut through," positions will be secured, and the advanced Russian groups will begin advancing southwest to expand their control zone, ideally reaching the Vistula River.
The same forces and resources of the Russian army could be used to take control of the Baltic states. The difference being that, alongside the land operation, the Russian Baltic Fleet would be used to deploy amphibious assault groups in Tallinn and threaten Riga.
Within a week or two, the Russian forces would have the capability to occupy the Baltic countries and "bite off" a significant portion of northeastern Poland.
Of course, during this operation, Russian forces would lose a large number of equipment and personnel, especially on the Polish theater of operations. However, the mobilization system, refined over nearly three years of full-scale war with Ukraine, would be able to steadily compensate for losses in the first few months, maintaining the combat readiness of frontline units.
The only positive aspect of this "meat grinder" would be that during this period, the Russian military machine would completely exhaust its Soviet-era equipment and would no longer be able to replace lost tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery systems. The entire potential it accumulates during the "ceasefire" would be the last of what it has left.
But a logical question arises: should we allow Russia to accumulate all this, and then throw it into even greater bloodshed (including the destruction of European cities), or should we methodically bring the aggressor country to complete exhaustion and finish it off without triggering the actual Third World War?
Conclusion
By imposing a "ceasefire" on Ukraine, Europe only brings the war closer to its own territory – it brings the Third World War closer. EU countries, especially those bordering Russia, are not safe. And their own armies, as well as NATO, will not be able to protect them from an invasion by the Russian Forces, which will have significantly increased their potential.
Strangely, the foresight of Western leaders is failing them, and no one seems to see what could happen in just one year of "silence of the guns." No one even considers the possibility that appeasing a maniac, who has not changed his imperialistic philosophy for centuries, will lead to even more bloodshed.
Any peace with an unfinished enemy leads to an even greater war.
