Alexander Kovalenko, military-political analyst, specifically for Minval.az
"As of the end of January 2024, in the Avdiivka region, Russian forces were unable to achieve all the objectives set by their command at the beginning of the offensive on October 10, 2023. For more than three and a half months, a force of about 45 thousand has been attempting to breach the defense of the small town, but without success.
On October 10, the Russian command set the following tasks for their forces in the first wave of the offensive: seize control of the Avdiivka terricon; cut off the railway in the northern sector; capture the village of Stepove and reach Berdychi; gain control of Highway 0542 from the northeast sector; exit through Vodyane to the villages of Severne and Tonenke in the southwest sector and capture them; establish fire control over 0542 from the southwest.
All of this was part of the plans for the first phase of the offensive, with responsibility for its execution assigned to units of the 1st Army Corps, the so-called "DPR," as well as the 20th and 150th Motorized Rifle Divisions. As known, the first wave of the offensive stalled, and since then, endless attempts to accomplish the assigned tasks have been ongoing.
As of today, the Russians have only succeeded in cutting the railway and capturing the terricon. The remaining tasks remain unfulfilled. This forced the Russians to change their tactics, and now they are focusing not so much on breaking through defense lines in open field conditions but on attempting to engage in urban warfare. Currently, Russian forces are trying to enter Avdiivka from the north, east, and south. Notably, they have achieved certain results in the southern sector. But let's go through everything step by step.
Intense battles are currently unfolding around Avdiivka in the following directions:
- From Krasnogorivka to Stepove, by the forces of the 15th and 30th Separate Mechanized Brigades of the 2nd Army Corps;
- From Krasnogorivka to Novobakhmutivka, by the forces of the 132nd Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 1st Army Corps and the 30th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 2nd Army Corps;
- From Krasnogorivka to Avdiivka, by the forces of the 114th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 1st Army Corps;
- From Veseloye to Avdiivka, by the forces of the 114th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 1st Army Corps;
- From Kamenka towards Avdiivka, by the forces of the 114th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 1st Army Corps and the 30th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 2nd Army Corps;
- From Vasilyivka towards Avdiivka, by the forces of the 114th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 1st Army Corps;
- Operate predominantly regular forces from Vodyane, Spartak, and Opytne, by the 55th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 41st Army Corps;
- From Vodyane to Severne, by the forces of the 55th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 41st Army Corps;
- In the industrial zone, units of the Reconnaissance, Sabotage Battalion "Veterans," and the 1st Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 1st Army Corps are operating.
It is evident that in the northern sector, the Russians are facing difficulties in breaking through to the Koksochemical Plant, leading them to attempt to advance through the fields to cut off Highway 0542, thereby blocking the supply route for the Avdiivka garrison. In the eastern sector, units of Russian forces, primarily the 114th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 1st Army Corps, are trying to advance and gain control of the area around the Sand Quarry.
Relative success for the Russians is noted in the southern sector, where they have reached the built-up area along Chernyshevsky, Sports, and Sobornaya streets. The intention of the Russian forces here is clear – to cut off Highway 0505, which turns into Hrushevskoho Street, leading to the 9th block. This is an area of multi-story buildings that, despite constant strikes from Russian tactical aviation using guided bombs, continues to serve as elevated positions.
Furthermore, Russian forces, advancing from the industrial area through Yasinovsky Lane, are attempting to exert pressure towards Kolosova Street. Here, the main operators are the Reconnaissance, Sabotage Battalion "Veterans," and the 1st Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 1st Army Corps. Additionally, units of the 80th Separate Tank Regiment of the 90th Tank Division have been redeployed to the Avdiivka area. This regiment was assigned to the "Center" troop group, responsible for the Liman-Kupya axis. Prior to this, units of the 239th Separate Tank Regiment, part of the same 90th Tank Division, operated in the Avdiivka area. This indicates that the Russian command continues to increase its forces in the Avdiivka region, despite the concentration of forces and resources from several combined-arms armies, totaling 45,000 personnel.
The shift in tactics, attempting to engage in urban warfare, will enable Russian forces to reduce casualties, which, according to Russian military correspondents and specialized publications, currently stand at a ratio of 1 to 10 in the fields. On the other hand, urban warfare will not allow them to cut off the main logistics artery supplying the garrison – Highway 0542 – and contribute to the encirclement of the city.
Avdiivka has often been compared to Bakhmut recently. However, this is incorrect. While the tactics employed by the Russians in the Avdiivka field are similar to those used in the assault on Uglehirsk and Bakhmut, the main difference lies in the area and logistics.
Bakhmut covers an area of nearly 42 square kilometers, whereas Avdiivka is just under 29 square kilometers. While the Russians had to advance from 7 to 15 kilometers towards Bakhmut, depending on the direction, the occupiers needed to make a leap of up to 2 kilometers in certain directions to reach Avdiivka, and from the south, the Line of Contact (LoC) almost directly touched the city limits.
Moreover, Avdiivka, compared to Bakhmut, is more vulnerable in terms of logistics since it is supplied by only one logistical artery, Highway 0542, and a number of field roads, the accessibility of which is highly dependent on weather conditions. Bakhmut, even when practically fully occupied, had a stable connection to the rear via two highways, 0504 and 0506, physical control over which the Russians still do not have to this day.
The Russian command is well aware of this vulnerability, and from the very first days of the offensive, it sought to exert pressure on Avdiivka from the northern sector, attempting to capture the villages of Stepove and Berdychi. Additionally, they aimed to advance from the Avdiivka terricon towards the Avdiivka Coke Plant. This is the shortest route to cut off Highway 0542, but at the same time, it is the least accessible for Russian forces.
The defense of Bakhmut also relied on high-rise buildings in the eastern and southeastern parts of the city, while the 9th block of Avdiivka was in an extremely vulnerable position.
Three months ago, on November 1st, when reviewing the situation in Avdiivka, I noted that the Russians would critically lack the allocated resources for surrounding Avdiivka, and the Russian command would need to extract resources from other military groups and strongholds. Such a practice was not popular in the Bakhmut region, where the main resources were composed of mercenaries and the Wagner Private Military Company. The current force of 45,000 personnel in the Avdiivka region represents peak figures during the assault on Bakhmut. In other words, the concentration of enemy forces, considering the extended front line and the city's area, is significantly larger at Avdiivka than during the Bakhmut assault. This distinction also sets the battles around Avdiivka apart from those in Bakhmut, as the Russian command is not sparing regular army forces, deploying them in exaggerated numbers around the small town.
Last fall, on October 10th, the Russian command believed that advancing on Avdiivka would be an easy task for them. One might think that with a shorter front line compared to Bakhmut, a smaller city area, a sharp dependence on logistics, a direct line of contact with the city limits, and vulnerable urban heights (high-rise buildings), the operation would be less challenging. What could go wrong?
However, Avdiivka proved to be a tough nut for the Russians, and for over three months, they have been struggling to make headway. Judging by the trends and the rapidly changing tactics, the Russian command seems likely to present its president, Putin, with increased bags of Russian soldiers' corpses rather than the capture of the city before the elections. Compared to Avdiivka, Bakhmut now appears like paradise to the Russians."
