Russian forces may intensify efforts to capture Kupyansk, Kharkiv region, in the coming weeks and have a grouping of forces in the area that appears to be less degraded than Russian groupings responsible for offensive efforts elsewhere in eastern Ukraine.
Russian forces appear to have conditions conducive to intensifying operations in the Kupyansk direction (Kharkiv-Luhansk region area) with the intent of making territorial gains in areas that are more operationally significant than other areas that Russian forces are currently attempting to seize. Ukrainian officials have stated that Russian forces aim to capture Kupyansk and Borova (35km west of Svatove) during winter 2024.
Russian seizure of those towns would likely force Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv region and set conditions for future Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. The tempo of Russian operations in the Kupyansk direction and the apparent configuration of Russian forces in occupied Luhansk and Kharkiv region overall does not indicate an impending Russian offensive effort along the entire Kupyansk-Lyman line (Kharkiv-Luhansk-northeastern Donetsk region area), similar to the failed Russian offensive effort in northeastern Ukraine in winter-spring 2023. Russian forces likely have not accumulated enough forces in Belgorod region to support launching large-scale offensive operations elsewhere in northern or northeastern Kharkiv region as of this writing.
Ukrainian officials have not publicly reported any sudden buildup of Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction indicating that a large-scale offensive to advance to the Oskil River is imminent. Russian forces appear to have gradually reconstituted units badly degraded during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in September 2022 and Russia’s failed winter-spring 2023 offensive, and the Russian command likely intends these relatively well-rested and reconstituted units to intensify localized offensive operations that Russian forces started in the area in October 2023.
Russian forces operating in the Kupyansk direction appear not yet to have committed a substantial force to current offensive operations in the area and thus have been able to sustain localized ground attacks without suffering losses similar to those that Russian forces have suffered in operations around Avdiivka and in southern Ukraine.
Russian forces operating in the Kupyansk direction, comprised largely of the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) and 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (both of the Western Military District [WMD]), have not heavily participated in large offensive operations since the culmination of the Russian winter-spring 2023 offensive in April 2023.
1st GTA and 6th CAA elements have likely reconstituted to a considerable degree through the incorporation of manpower generated by Russia’s September 2022 partial mobilization and continued crypto-mobilization efforts.
Russian forces may be deploying new forces to the Kupyansk direction at a rate roughly equal to Russian losses in the area as they have done throughout Ukraine, although these elements are likely poorly trained Storm-Z and Storm-V assault detachments and not more combat-effective regular elements of the 6th CAA and 1st GTA.
These elements likely do not need to reconstitute their kit to full doctrinal end strength to support new offensive operations because current Russian offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction rely heavily on dismounted infantry assaults and only sporadically use small mechanized assaults.
Russian regular forces in the Kupyansk direction are drawn primarily from the Western Military District and thus benefit from a degree of organizational coherence unlike Russian forces in other parts of Ukraine, which are often thrown together from various military districts and airborne (VDV) units.[9] The relative coherence of the WMD force grouping in the Kupyansk direction likely generates relatively more effective command and control (C2) among these forces, although it remains unclear if these WMD elements are able to conduct large-scale assaults that would be significantly more effective than the disorganized and costly Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka.
UK outlet the Telegraph reported on January 4 that an unspecified source ”close“ to the Ukrainian military stated that Russian forces may conduct a ”ground offensive” as early as January 15.
Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo responded to the Telegraph article on January 5 and stated that the Ukrainian military has not observed a change in the composition of Russian forces in Kharkiv region or in Russia bordering Kharkiv region and that Russian forces continue offensive operations near Synkivka with the aim of capturing Kupyansk.
Ukrainian Kharkiv region Head Oleh Synehubov also responded to the Telegraph noting that Russian forces are not concentrating in Kharkiv region in preparation for a large-scale offensive and that the intensity of Russian attacks in the Kupyansk direction has decreased in the past three days due to bad weather conditions.
Synehubov noted that Russian forces are using the slower tempo of operations caused by poor weather conditions to deploy reinforcements to the frontline and to train and coordinate units.
Fityo and Synehubov’s comments are consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces may intensify offensive operations, though not launch a full-scale offensive operation, with the existing grouping of forces in the Kupyansk direction. Russian forces may have conducted a gradual buildup of forces since Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian military concentrated over 100,000 personnel in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions as of October 2023.
