If we abstract ourselves from the specific outcomes of the fighting for the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad defensive area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces—which, quite possibly, may come under full enemy control within the next month—the further prospects of the enemy’s offensive look rather ambiguous, namely:
- On the one hand, the capture of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad opens up a fairly obvious operational‑tactical opportunity for the enemy: the ability to organize and conduct an offensive toward Dobropillia. Moreover, with relatively high chances of breaking through quickly to its near approaches—primarily from the south (advancing from Pokrovsk with forces of the 2nd Combined Arms Army) and from the east (advancing from the bridgehead of the 51st Combined Arms Army on the Kazennyi Torets River, which has very noticeably “come alive” in this direction over the past week).
- On the other hand, employing during such an offensive (specifically toward Dobropillia) the operational‑tactical method favored by Russian command—encirclement and flanking maneuvers around a Ukrainian defensive area—is unlikely to succeed. Simply because the necessary conditions are absent: Ukrainian forces have virtually eliminated the enemy’s penetration along the Kucheriv Yar–Zolotyi Kolodets axis, and they are also holding the Volne–Novyi Donbas line fairly steadily. This leaves the enemy with only a frontal advance on Dobropillia from the south and southeast—an approach fraught with another round of excessive losses.
Moreover, in operational‑tactical terms, in the near future the Russian command will face a dilemma on the adjacent flank of the “Center” and “South” Groupings of Forces: whether to advance on Dobropillia or instead concentrate on breaking through toward Druzhkivka from the southwest.
At present, in the sector of the 8th Combined Arms Army, the enemy is advancing quite actively along the general axis of Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka, that is, attempting to achieve results according to the second option. However, the renewed activation of the 51st Combined Arms Army in the Dobropillia direction suggests that the first option is also being considered by its command.
From an operational‑strategic perspective, the capture of Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka carries significantly greater weight for the enemy than the capture of Dobropillia. This is because it brings Russian forces closer from the south to the last major urban agglomeration in Donbas under Ukrainian control—the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk area—whereas taking Dobropillia would yield only a limited operational‑tactical success.
In essence, the enemy’s offensive toward Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka is one element of a broader, more “synchronized” plan by the Russian command, which envisages reaching the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration simultaneously from several directions: from the Lyman axis (Grouping “West”), the Sloviansk axis (Grouping “South”), and the Kostiantynivka axis (Grouping “South”). This far exceeds in scale the hypothetical concept of a limited breakthrough toward Dobropillia by the forces of the “Center” Grouping alone.
There is another factor as well.
After prolonged and fairly bloody fighting for Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, the armies of the Russian “Center” Grouping are, frankly, far from being in good shape. Even now, during the final stage of the battles for the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration, their command is increasingly forced to take “tactical pauses,” spending a long time and considerable effort to concentrate sufficient assault infantry in forward units and formations to continue the offensive. Attacking or assault actions by units “from platoon level and above” have become quite rare. For the most part, the enemy is trying to “sneak through” on a regular daily basis using small infantry (assault) groups of 5–6 soldiers, or even fewer—2–3. In the overwhelming majority of cases, these attempts are made as covertly as possible, trying not to draw attention.
In other words, the “Center” Grouping has clearly expended much of its reserves and resources in the battles for Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. It has very little assault infantry left at the front, and what remains is in critically short supply. This is also evident from the pace of advance of its leading units and formations along the “main strike” directions—they are extremely slow and unhurried.
At the same time, the Russian command has moved a number of “heavy” reserves from the Southern operational zone into the area of operations of the “South” Grouping of Forces, which is acting specifically toward the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration (on the Sloviansk and Kostiantynivka axes). These include units such as the 70th Motorized Rifle Division from the 18th Combined Arms Army of the “Dnipro” Grouping, as well as the main forces of the 49th Combined Arms Army from the same grouping.
However, Sloviansk–Kramatorsk is a long road (it is still necessary to take Lyman, Kostiantynivka, and Druzhkivka), a laborious one (ideally requiring the crossing of the Siverskyi Donets River and an advance toward Izium), and, most importantly, far more expensive than Dobropillia. In the Dobropillia direction, a result could be “delivered” faster and more cheaply in every sense, since the scale of the two hypothetical operations is completely different and hardly comparable.
I think January will provide the answer to which “path” the enemy command decides to take.
