Military counterintelligence and investigators from the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), with the support of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Commander of the Special Operations Forces (SOF), detained a "reactivated" agent of Russian military intelligence (commonly known as GRU).
The suspect, a lieutenant colonel and commander of a Special Operations Forces unit, was recruited by the Russian forces before the full-scale war began.
In the spring of 2024, a Russian GRU officer remotely "activated" him and assigned him the task of transmitting plans for Defense Forces' operations in rear areas to Russia.
The aggressors were particularly interested in intelligence regarding sabotage and reconnaissance missions conducted by Ukrainian special forces behind Russian lines in the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimea directions.
Using his official position, the mole gained access to planned routes of troop movements, weaponry, and operational targets, which he then passed to the Russian forces.
The Russian forces intended to use this information to ambush and eliminate Ukrainian special forces personnel either on the front line or in occupied areas in southern Ukraine.
The agent also leaked data about other Defense Forces units to his Russian handler.
As part of a special operation, SSU military counterintelligence meticulously documented the traitor's crimes and apprehended him. Comprehensive measures were also taken to secure Defense Forces' locations.
Investigators found that the individual had been recruited by Russian military intelligence through acquaintances in Russia with whom he maintained contact.
During searches, covert communication devices, computer equipment, a mobile phone, and data storage devices were seized from the detainee.
The SSU has charged the suspect under Part 2 of Article 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (treason committed under martial law). The individual is in custody and faces life imprisonment with confiscation of property.
