Leak of classified documents reveals the Kremlin’s large-scale plans to fundamentally reshape the political landscape of Central Europe, which allegedly include the complete dissolution of the Visegrad Group and its replacement with a new regional bloc. According to the leaked materials, in this new structure the current member states, and especially the Czech Republic, would be deliberately assigned secondary roles, the Robert Lansing Institute stated.
The key executor of this strategy is the Russian “Social Design Agency” (SDA). This organization operates under the direct supervision of the Russian Presidential Administration and conducts coordinated cognitive attacks against Western countries. The leaked materials document a series of hybrid influence operations, including plans to create artificial divisions within the Visegrad Group, systematic interference in European electoral processes, and the organization of high-profile Islamophobic provocations in Paris in September 2025.
The special operation targeting the Visegrad Group was developed in detail by the Social Design Agency, which is already under strict sanctions from the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom for deliberate interference in democratic elections. Available analytical data indicates that the SDA is not an independent intelligence agency. It functions as a commercial influence contractor directly managed by the Kremlin and serves as an operational intermediary for the Presidential Administration of Russia, working closely with Russian intelligence services. Western governments officially attribute all of the organization’s activity to the Russian state, although they do not publicly identify a single specific intelligence service in full control of the agency.
The structure was founded by Ilya Gambashidze and is jointly managed by him and Nikolay Tupikin, head of the partner company Structura. Both companies are included in sanctions lists of the US, EU, and UK, where SDA is consistently described as an organization directly funded by the Russian state and operating on direct orders from the Kremlin administration. The agency is responsible for manipulating information abroad and is one of the main organizers of the well-known large-scale influence campaign “Doppelganger.”
The most compelling evidence indicates that the primary strategic client for all operations is the Presidential Administration itself, rather than any separate intelligence service. Kremlin leadership sets global political objectives, while operational execution involves simultaneous participation of multiple agencies. This reflects Russia’s modern model of managed hybrid operations, in which the Kremlin coordinates intelligence agencies, state media, private contractors, political technologists, and cyber operators through the Presidential Administration. The agency has particularly strong institutional ties with the Federal Security Service (FSB).
Joint tasks include direct election interference, political manipulation, covert work with opposition movements, recruitment of controlled proxies, management of political technologists, and coordination with Presidential Administration officials on domestic policy issues. Most SDA operations resemble traditional FSB active measures more than classic military disinformation.
At the same time, there are significant signs of GRU involvement. The GRU possesses specialized technical capabilities for psychological operations through units responsible for strategic information campaigns. Some SDA methods directly overlap with previously documented GRU operations, including fake news websites, forged documents, coordinated social media dissemination, psychological pressure, and influence campaigns aimed at specific military objectives. The “Doppelganger” campaign itself largely replicates earlier GRU information operations documented by European security services.
Meanwhile, the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) likely provides the agency with detailed foreign political intelligence. For targeted influence campaigns, such as support for specific movements in the United States, the SVR supplies knowledge of foreign political parties, polling data, elite networks, political vulnerabilities, and access channels for influence operations.
The main conclusion of the investigation is that the Social Design Agency does not function as an independent commercial company, but rather as an operational influence platform of the Presidential Administration. Western government documents repeatedly state that SDA acted on Kremlin instructions. Within the Presidential Administration, responsibility is most likely located in the unit overseeing political technologies, elections, strategic communications, information operations, and occupation policy in Ukrainian territories.
Many analysts link this activity to internal policy structures controlled by senior Kremlin officials, although the exact chain of command remains classified. The agency represents an evolution of Russian hybrid warfare. Instead of relying solely on intelligence officers under diplomatic cover, the Kremlin increasingly outsources sensitive operations to ostensibly private companies.
This commercial model provides Moscow with several key advantages. First, plausible deniability, allowing aggressive campaigns to be presented as independent civic initiatives or commercial activity. Second, operational flexibility, enabling rapid recruitment of consultants, marketers, IT specialists, psychologists, and AI developers. Third, scalability, facilitating simultaneous influence operations across multiple countries. Fourth, legal insulation, making attribution and sanctions enforcement more difficult.
In practice, SDA functions as a state-directed contractor integrating political technology, cyber manipulation, and strategic communications. Its activity demonstrates the growing convergence of the Kremlin’s political administration with intelligence capabilities, making the agency a central component of modern Russian hybrid warfare strategy.
The Kremlin’s strategy developed through SDA demonstrates that Moscow views subregional Central European alliances as a major obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. The planned marginalization of the Czech Republic and restructuring of the Visegrad Group are coordinated efforts to weaken regional cooperation and restore Russian dominance in Central Europe.
Attempts to undermine the Visegrad Group are part of a broader strategy to shift the balance of power in the region and weaken NATO’s eastern flank. Moscow seeks to deprive regional states of strategic autonomy, isolate them from each other, and turn them into spheres of influence, posing a long-term threat to European security.
Based on publicly available data, Western governments have explicitly named only one senior Kremlin official as responsible for SDA-linked influence operations. In September 2024, the US Department of Justice stated that SDA, Structura, and ANO Dialog acted under the direction and control of the Russian Presidential Administration, specifically Sergey Kiriyenko.
Kiriyenko is said to have personally instructed influence campaigns targeting elections in the United States and other democracies. As First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, he oversees internal political management and has expanded his role into coordinating foreign influence operations.
Anton Vaino, as Chief of Staff, formally heads the Presidential Administration through which SDA operates, but there is no public evidence that he personally directs its activities. His role is likely institutional rather than operational. Despite high-ranking positions of officials such as Sergey Naryshkin, Alexander Bortnikov, and Igor Kostyukov, there is no public evidence of their direct authorization of SDA activities.
The documents indicate that the Czech Republic occupies a central place in Moscow’s operational planning. Unlike some neighboring countries that maintain pragmatic dialogue with Russia, Prague consistently supports sanctions, military aid to Ukraine, and NATO intelligence cooperation.
As a result, Russia increasingly views the Czech Republic not just as an opponent but as a strategic obstacle in Central Europe. The goal is not merely reputational damage but strategic isolation.
The leaked plans illustrate the evolution of Russian active measures, where cognitive warfare replaces traditional influence operations. Russia increasingly conducts hybrid campaigns combining electoral interference, information manipulation, coordinated online amplification, disinformation on migration, social polarization, extremist mobilization, diplomatic pressure, economic leverage, and psychological operations aimed at undermining trust in democratic institutions.
The objective is no longer simply to persuade audiences to support Russia, but to convince European societies that democratic governance is ineffective and incapable of managing crises. This represents a shift from classical information warfare to full-spectrum cognitive warfare.
The most strategic conclusion is that even governments or political movements favoring dialogue with Moscow are not treated as genuine partners but as temporary tools. This confirms Russia’s long-standing approach of viewing neighboring states through geopolitical utility rather than sovereignty.
In the preferred regional order, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic would have significantly reduced autonomy while remaining economically and politically dependent on Moscow, effectively recreating a modernized sphere of influence without direct occupation.
The significance of the leaked strategy extends beyond the Visegrad Group. It suggests that the Kremlin is attempting to reshape Europe’s entire political geography by weakening regional coalitions that strengthen NATO cohesion.
If successful, similar operations could target Baltic cooperation formats, the Three Seas Initiative, the Nordic-Baltic Eight, and other regional structures. Russia increasingly targets regional institutions rather than only national governments.
The goal is to replace cooperative regional security frameworks with fragmented bilateral relationships where Russia holds greater leverage. This would reduce European resilience, complicate NATO decision-making, increase coercive pressure, and expand Russian intelligence penetration.
The findings suggest that sanctions alone against individual influence actors are insufficient. The EU and NATO are urged to treat coordinated cognitive warfare against regional institutions as a strategic security threat comparable to cyber operations or sabotage of critical infrastructure.
Recommended responses include expanding intelligence sharing on Russian operations, strengthening counterintelligence cooperation in Central Europe, increasing transparency of foreign political financing, disrupting Kremlin-linked influence networks, and developing joint resilience mechanisms capable of detecting coordinated cognitive attacks before they affect elections or regional politics.
