By Alexander Kovalenko for OBOZ
In February 2025, Russian forces continued their offensive actions with several distinctive features, including wave-like use of equipment and human resources. All this impacted the loss indicators, with some categories showing the lowest losses in the past six months of the war, while others set new absolute records.
Personnel Losses
In February, Russian forces suffered the lowest personnel losses since August 2024—36,570. However, this is still a very high figure, which is barely compensated by Russia's mobilization efforts.
After several months of record-high losses (specifically in November 2024—45,720; December 2024—48,670; and January 2025—48,240), the February figures were influenced by a decrease in the intensity of infantry assaults. Peak storming activity was not constant throughout the month but occurred in waves on specific days, often coinciding with international events such as the Munich Security Conference and the meeting between U.S. and Russian representatives in Saudi Arabia.
There was also a sharp rise in losses in relation to the area of captured territory, with Russian forces taking 188 km² of Ukrainian land in February. Their average loss rate was over 190 personnel per km². For comparison, in 2024 this figure was 128 personnel per km², and in January 2025 it was 150 per km².
The noticeable increase in losses, even with a reduction in intensity, is due to the low staffing of units and the supply crisis, making effective use of these units in offensives impossible and leading to high personnel losses.
Tank Losses
In February 2025, Russian forces lost 331 tanks, which remains within the average loss rate since mid-2024.
As I have previously noted, the low loss rate of main battle tanks is due to a combination of reduced supply to the front and the Russian command's efforts to preserve these tanks, resulting in very limited use.
It is possible that in 2025, Russia's largest central tank reserves, such as the 349th and 769th tank reserve bases, may deplete, leading to a crisis in providing Russian forces with main battle tanks.
Armored Fighting Vehicle Losses
In February, no records were set for armored fighting vehicle losses, which is understandable given the reduced intensity of combat and the decrease in the number of armored vehicles in service. Nevertheless, the loss figure of 596 armored vehicles remains quite high.
Unlike tanks, Russia's defense industry has a relatively serial production of armored fighting vehicles and can partially compensate for losses with new units. However, this is not enough to make up for losses like those in February, so the bulk of losses continues to be replenished from Soviet-era stockpiles.
Artillery Losses
In February 2025, enemy artillery became much more active, leading to intensified counter-battery operations and a rise in artillery losses for Russian forces—1,415 units.
This is a very high number, but these losses are unavoidable due to the lack of proper fire support for storming actions from armored vehicles, which led to artillery being tasked with this role. However, Russian artillery is outmatched by Ukrainian artillery in terms of range and accuracy.
Rocket System Losses
For the first time since 2024, Russian forces lost a significant number of multiple launch rocket systems—38 units.
Like with artillery, the increase in rocket system losses is attributed to the lack of fire support for advancing infantry, leading artillery to take on a major role, with all the resulting challenges.
Additionally, the rocket systems being lost are increasingly unconventional, such as those mounted on MT-LB chassis, BMP-1, T-72, T-80, Ural-4320, and even naval ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft mounts.
Air Defense Losses
In February 2025, Russian forces lost 38 air defense systems.
This is an average loss rate, indicating that the systematic efforts to target enemy air defense systems are successfully continuing.
Vehicle Losses
This category saw an absolute record of 3,472 losses.
The vehicle losses category consistently sets records due to the shortage of tanks, armored vehicles, and armored cars, leading to the use of non-specialized civilian vehicles for storming actions. Consequently, losses in this category will continue to set records going forward.
Special Equipment Losses
In February, the number of destroyed special equipment was among the lowest since February 2023—36 units.
The explanation for this is simple: the need for evacuation decreased due to the lesser use of armored vehicles, and special equipment has become much scarcer after three years of full-scale war due to its own losses.
Conclusions
The command of the Russian forces is forced to balance between limited resources for conducting a large-scale offensive campaign and the need to present the illusion of unlimited capabilities for advancing and capturing Ukrainian territories to Western countries.
Existing problems with equipment are hard to hide, especially when the front lines are filled not with main battle tanks (MBTs) and armored vehicles (AFVs), but with "Nivas," "Zhigulis," and "bukhankas."
In November 2024, when reviewing the losses of Russian occupying forces for the month, I wrote the following: "It is evident that such high loss figures will persist at least until Donald Trump's inauguration. 'At least' means that after the inauguration, Putin will attempt to demonstrate strength to Trump through intense combat actions, simulating unlimited capabilities and endless resources. But this is not the case, and it is already visible in several categories of losses for Russian forces in November. In the future, this points to a decrease in the pace and scale of offensive operations for Russian forces—whether they like it or not."
By the end of January 2025 and especially February, we can already clearly see this. The situation for Russian forces in terms of potential and capabilities will only worsen with each passing month.
The demilitarization and denazification of the Russian army are proceeding strictly according to plan.
