The Ukrainian command’s strategy on the Kursk operational front has become increasingly clear, especially after strikes on the bridge crossings over the Seim River and the likely advance of Ukrainian forces to the western bank of the river in the Byrdyn-Tyotkino sector.
It appears that the objective is to bring a section of Russia’s Kursk region under full control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), particularly the area south of the Seim River, stretching from Alekseyevka to the Spalnoye-Giryi line.
As of yesterday evening, the immediate goal seems to be the elimination of the "Tyotkino salient." Given that the UAF's forward units have already reached the approximate line of Komarovka-Novoivanovka from the east, this seems quite feasible.
As for the Russian command’s reaction to the developments on the Kursk operational front, it seems clear that they have decided to "hold out to the last" (predictably). The Northern grouping of Russian forces has been ordered to "find internal reserves," redirecting personnel from various depots, including former Königsberg and "polar units," to field at least 5-6 combat-ready battalion-level formations in key areas. As a joke, it was suggested that the fashionable General Lapin be sent to Korenevo.
However, the only thing the senior "comrades" agreed upon was to return the Northern group’s regular forces and assets, meaning the units that are permanently part of the Leningrad Military District (LVO). For instance, units of the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade have already been spotted in the rear of the Kursk grouping, and it seems that the 80th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade will also soon join.
The first brigade is coming from the Kramatorsk direction, and the second from the Pridneprovsky direction. Both are part of the 14th Army Corps.
In total, these would be the "desired" 5-6 battalions, but that is assuming these brigades make it to Kursk in one piece.
However, it is clear that the real need for forces and resources on this front is much greater. The operational density of Russian troops on the Kursk front is currently insufficient to completely halt the UAF’s advance.
Russian forces are unable to maintain proper standards in this regard. While they can block key transportation hubs and routes, they cannot adequately address the problem or stop the UAF.
In simple terms, the Russians currently maintain "pocket defenses" on this front, allowing forward mobile UAF groups and units to find gaps in the enemy’s defenses and advance on the flanks and rear. Although they are trying to strengthen these defenses, they have not yet achieved a continuous line.
The mentioned "5-6 battalions" will not fundamentally solve the issue. Sooner or later, the enemy command will have to consider larger-scale reserves.
Moreover, the Russian command, in its usual style, is deploying units "on the fly." I described this in detail during the Balakliya offensive, so I won't repeat myself.
The destroyed and burned Russian columns near Rylsk and Korenevo are a direct consequence of the command style demonstrated by the Northern group.
It is thus evident that the regrouping of specific Northern group forces from the Volchansk direction (units and subunits of the 11th and 44th Army Corps) has failed to solve the problem. The enemy has not yet been able to stop the UAF.
At the same time, the Russian General Staff is in no hurry to deploy its main reserves as a "stopgap" on the Kursk front. After all, no one expected incompetence on their part... In the end, those fashionable striped pants and fancy epaulets aren’t just for show.
Some of them even dared to voice a "bold idea" during certain meetings (which were almost held in a herd-like manner)... Why not imitate the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and prepare, so to speak, their "asymmetrical response" in an unexpected location?
The problem is that this response, just like the repair work in the Kursk region, will require another substantial batch of forces and resources.
The question is… where can they quickly and sufficiently get these?
Mobilization will no longer save them because it requires the main resource that Putin almost no longer has – TIME.
So, in a strategic sense, the military-political leadership of Russia (what we call a group of psychopaths and chekists who have seized the Kremlin) is facing several, let's say, "problems" in the context of the current course of the war:
- The "leaks" that threaten to turn into a real flood in the Kursk region need to be patched with SOMETHING...
- Pokrovsk and Toretsk also "need to be taken" (but they haven't even crawled to the first one yet)... abandoning these "offensive ambitions" for repair work in Kursk would mean the same as last year's "offensive" meant for the UAF...
- Obviously, neither the UAF nor Ukraine in general will "surrender or collapse this year." Meanwhile, within Russia itself, there have appeared some rather significant and unpleasant "alarm bells" in the financial and economic sphere (it might happen that in the next "annual cycle," something important will start to be in short supply)...
- The Kremlin is probably now frantically calculating the consequences of continuing the mobilization deployment of the Russian Armed Forces. But these consequences are unpredictable, even now... from the economy (including the "wildly growing" military-industrial complex), which already suffers from a shortage of skilled labor in semi-isolation, to the socio-political sphere, or "interethnic relations."
And all of this needs to be addressed not just SIMULTANEOUSLY, but in a very short time...
Moreover, this requires a whole LOT of money, resources, and most importantly – people.
As it turned out, if they start scraping the bottom of Russia's "dreaded" mobilization resources... they will, of course, find plenty of unsuitable and reserved individuals to put in the Kremlin's ranks. But, as usual... there are nuances.
And the main one is – who said that Ukraine will "quietly observe" the Kremlin's attempts to "solve its current and future problems"...?
In my opinion... the best gifts are usually prepared for Christmas...
