The entire issue around Iran ultimately comes down to the question of “what Trump wants” at any given moment—and no one knows that, sometimes not even he himself. That’s why we focus on what can be tangibly observed.
As I said in previous interviews, “everything was heading toward an American strike, unless Trump suddenly decided to back out.” And on the night of January 15, he backed out at the last moment. If the IDF previously had preliminary air defense and related units on alert, that night measures began that had last been carried out on the night of June 13, during the Israeli strike on Iran. This time, however, after some time a stand-down order came, and those measures were rolled back. As the Passover song says, “How is this night different from all other nights?” Such actions are not taken based on media reports—the IDF General Staff is in constant contact with U.S. Central Command and coordinates actions with it. Since a stand-down was ordered, readiness was stepped back by one level: combat readiness remains, mobilized reservists are in place, and we are awaiting further developments. The American strike has been postponed for now, but not completely canceled.
With the forces and assets currently deployed in the theater, the Americans could have carried out a limited strike, for example against Basij facilities and other repressive agencies. If the Iranian regime had then stopped executions and the shooting of protesters, Trump could have presented this as a victory. Now, if he wishes, he can claim that the Iranian regime has already stopped these actions due to the mere threat of a strike—and that this is an even greater victory. This depends on further developments and U.S.–Iran negotiations.
Iranian authorities are using not only electronic warfare against Starlink, but also conventional counterintelligence and police measures, including door-to-door apartment searches. Taken together, these measures are proving quite effective.
There is a large gap between “striking Iran” and “toppling the Iranian regime.” Overthrowing the regime would require not only stronger and more prolonged strikes, but also ground forces—if not foreign ones, then serious local armed anti-government groups, not just civilian protesters. It would also require part of the security forces to defect, and so on. None of this exists at present. Therefore, an American strike would lead to Iranian retaliation against U.S. bases, neighboring Arab countries, and Israel, without necessarily bringing the overthrow of the regime any closer.
That is why the Arab Gulf states tried to dissuade Trump from striking. Ideally, most of them would like to see the Iranian regime overthrown, but if a strike leads not to that, but merely to a new war and incoming attacks against them, they have no interest in it. For the same reason, they oppose the use of their airspace and military bases for strikes on Iran. The United States can strike from the Indian Ocean, bypassing their territory, and from the Mediterranean via Syria and Iraq—countries no one asks—but overall the logic is the same. If the Iranian regime were overthrown, these same countries would rush to embrace the Americans and eagerly offer to expand bases and open their airspace. As long as the regime remains, it is better to hedge.
For Israel, the overthrow of the Iranian regime is a long-cherished dream, but strikes are assessed concretely based on the situation and military considerations. In the case of a limited American strike, there is a possibility that the Iranians would be satisfied with retaliating against U.S. bases and would not draw Israel in—but relying on that would be unreasonable, and we assume retaliation against us. The Iranians have rebuilt their missile arsenal, if not fully, then to a significant extent, and an Iranian response would mean heavy missile strikes. In June, we disrupted a significant portion of these launches by striking launchers and missile bases. Now, however, it is unclear whether Trump would give the green light for that, if he does not want a prolonged war. And even if he does, additional preparation would be preferable. Without that, our missile defense will face greater strain than it did then: a large number of expended Arrow interceptors have not yet been replenished, and the Americans at that time used up a quarter of their available THAAD interceptor stockpiles, whose replenishment will also take a long time.
Overall, from the previous round, both Israel and Iran have drawn many useful technical and tactical lessons in offensive and defensive aspects, and who implements these lessons better will be revealed in the next round.
The U.S. continues to deploy forces to the Middle East, and depending on the situation, Trump could again choose one of the military options. So, for now, everyone involved is preparing for the continuation of the story. The more forces that are deployed, the more serious operations can be conducted, but again, everything ultimately depends on Trump’s desires: whether he wants to overthrow the regime, doesn’t want to, wants a smaller operation, which kind exactly, or nothing at all.
In Gaza, according to the pre-announced schedule for transitioning to the second stage of the U.S.-mediated settlement, the Americans proclaimed a technocratic government composed of mid-level Palestinian Authority officials. Soon, the Peace Council will likely be announced, and by the end of the month, the composition of international forces might also be finalized. But aside from the fact that Hamas has not yet released the body of the last hostage, the main problem remains: Hamas refuses to disarm. Therefore, it accepts the technocratic government only as a façade behind which it will continue to govern according to Mao Zedong’s principle, “the rifle gives power.” International forces will not disarm Hamas, as the relevant countries have already stated, and realistically, only the IDF can disarm it. Operational plans for this exist, but for now, the resumption of war runs counter to Trump’s line, and his agreement is needed for this as well. Until that consent is given and combat operations resume, the reality remains as it has been since the start of the war in Gaza: the real options are either Israeli occupation or Hamas control. Currently, we are seeing exactly that: half the Gaza Strip under Israeli occupation, half under Hamas authority.
In Lebanon, we have been preparing for several months for a round of “weakening Hezbollah,” because the Lebanese army’s success in disarming it has been more verbal than real. Some weapons have been seized, but instead of being destroyed, they are stored in warehouses, and Hezbollah could reclaim them if needed. According to Netanyahu, Trump has already given the green light, but so far we are still conducting targeted strikes and have not moved to large-scale operations. This round could be conducted together with Iran or separately. There is also a possibility that this time Hezbollah will not quietly endure the strikes, but its capabilities are far from what they were before October 7, so the situation is calmer for now.
In Yemen, after the rapid advance of the pro-Emirati Southern Transitional Council and the equally rapid counteroffensive by the pro-Saudi Presidential Leadership Council, the STC has been defeated, and the dream of an independent South Yemen, friendly to the UAE and Israel—directly opposite the friendly Somaliland—has been completely crushed. Against this backdrop, the Houthis in northern Yemen are considering whether the STC might turn against them next, but Saudi Arabia, which previously took a beating from the Houthis, has not shown any such enthusiasm, though anything is possible in Yemen. Meanwhile, the Houthis are threatening to strike any Israeli targets in Somaliland if they appear there, and have also stated they are preparing for the next round against Israel itself. So far, their actions have been tied to Gaza: if there is war there, they fire at Israel; if there is a ceasefire, they do not. We will see if they continue this policy.
In Syria, the situation remains unchanged. Negotiations with al-Sharaa have so far led nowhere because we refuse to leave the buffer zone. Regarding discussions about possible Russian presence in southern Syria, it would be good if reports claiming we are finally opposed were confirmed. All this supposed balancing between Russian and Turkish presence is an old atavism from Israel’s previous flirtations with Russia during the time of significant Russian presence in Syria. In reality, the resumption of Russian patrols at the border does us no practical good.
With Turkey, the confrontation in Syria remains indirect. When they tried to deploy air defense and electronic warfare systems on Syrian bases, we bombed them, while simultaneously negotiating about various delineations of spheres of influence. A full-scale direct war with Turkey is still a distant prospect, not an immediate one. Despite Turkey’s anti-Israel stance, a war with Israel is not the same as a war with Greece, both militarily and politically: NATO, the U.S. position, American weaponry, etc. But where they can, they will still try to throw smaller obstacles in our way.
The Saudi Arabia–Pakistan alliance surprised only those unaware of their decades-long cooperation—nuclear, military, and otherwise. Now they have just formalized it. If they manage to bring Turkey into the alliance, such a Sunni axis would be unpleasant, but not catastrophic. Overall, Saudi Arabia is seeking its own path. Unlike the UAE, which more or less follows the U.S.–Israel line, the Saudis maneuver between the U.S., Israel, Iran, Qatar, Turkey, etc., pursuing their own ambitions and calculations.
In short, returning to Iran: everything there is in Trump’s hands. But even if the Iranian regime falls for one reason or another, it doesn’t mean we’ll just sit under a fig tree and be at peace—things don’t work that way. If not Nasser, then Saddam; if not Saddam, then Iran; if not Iran, then Erdoğan, and so on. There will always be new victories and new fighters. Peace is only a dream.
