The fuel supply system in the Russian army is structured in such a way that at the operational level, it is carried out in two main ways – by rail transport and pipelines. However, at the tactical and operational-tactical levels (i.e., for delivery directly to the units, parts, and subdivisions), road transport is actively involved.
In other words, for any actions of the Russian troops related to their mobility (for example, operational troop deployment), or better said – with the need to move them over significant distances (reorganization, concentration, rotation, etc.), the Russian command needs to have corresponding fuel transshipment points in the relevant areas where significant volumes of fuel can be processed.
These are locations where two main activities must take place:
- Receive fuel from rail and pipeline transport and store significant volumes of it.
- "Dispense" this fuel to military fuel tankers.
Of course, in conditions of intense combat, fuel can be stored in tankers or directly in fuel trucks that are refueled at oil refineries. However, this is a temporary solution and a very dispersed one, because otherwise, the Russians will simply burn the concentration of these tanks, and road transport will become vulnerable in the operational-tactical rear, where the Russian strike capabilities capable of reaching them are significantly higher compared to the operational-strategic rear.
Thus, Russian troops urgently need these fuel transshipment points (a kind of "connecting link" when transitioning from one type of transport to another) to ensure fuel supply throughout the entire chain to the troops, especially when aiming to deliver fuel directly to regiments, brigades, and divisions.
At the same time, two minimum (I would say, "very desirable") conditions should be met:
- These transshipment points should be located directly in the zone where troop actions are occurring or planned.
- They must be maximally close to the operational-tactical rear of the troops.
This directly impacts the supply of fuel to the troops. This is the so-called "transportation distance" and, accordingly, the time required to deliver fuel directly to the "companies and battalions."
Moreover, in this matter, the Russian troops must ensure the continuity and "processing" (transshipment) of significant volumes of fuel. For example, preparing a couple of battalions for an offensive requires one volume, while preparing a pair of combined-arms armies for operational deployment in a given operational direction demands entirely different volumes.
Of course, in the context of the overall actions of Russian troops, their command and logistics bodies are quite capable of establishing field fuel depots of various levels or "diversifying" fuel supply for their troops, often demonstrating ingenuity and creativity. This is especially true when their troops are engaged in maneuver warfare that directly depends on their mobility.
However, I emphasize again: even in the conditions of a more or less "static" front, it is extremely important for the Russians to have, in their operational-strategic rear, a location (preferably several locations) where they can "dispense" diesel fuel, aviation kerosene, and gasoline into fuel tankers. After all, it is impossible to deliver a rail tank car directly to every tank company or motorized rifle battalion.
It’s no secret that the Russian command, in this regard (i.e., in terms of direct fuel supply to the troops), is actively trying to use relevant civilian infrastructure—both on its territory and at facilities on our occupied territories.
There’s nothing surprising or extraordinary about this. Such facilities must have specialized equipment for storing and dispensing fuel. Civilian oil depots, which were equipped in this way during peacetime, are quite convenient for this purpose. Exclusively military structures, in certain cases, may simply be unable to handle the required volumes. Using a "Rosneft" or "Lukoil" depot for this purpose is a perfectly acceptable practice.
Not all of these facilities are entirely suitable (e.g., in terms of capacity or the ability to "process" the required fuel volumes needed by the troops), but their mere presence in areas convenient for Russian troops and along necessary operational directions greatly simplifies and accelerates the entire process of supplying fuel to their forces.
Moreover, in certain operational directions and zones, this structure may be the only option for supplying Russian troops with fuel. As a result, it can significantly influence the course, speed, and progress of their operations, particularly those involving troop deployment, concentration, or maneuvering in combat scenarios.
Therefore, when "striking remnants" of Ukrainian UAVs hit Russian oil depots in the Kursk, Bryansk, Belgorod, and Rostov regions or Krasnodar Krai, it’s not about making gasoline more expensive at gas stations in Rostov or Belgorod—it’s about something entirely different.
The Russian army is forced to look for alternative fuel delivery and transshipment routes, which increases their transportation distance and, consequently, the time required to deliver a conditional ton of fuel to the troops, as well as the resources spent on this. In general, their fuel supply chain is temporarily disrupted.
Another factor directly related to these strikes is the evident increase in variability and the expansion of the methodology for conducting these strikes.
Ukraine is actively testing a whole range of "influence tools" at the operational-strategic level, which can be applied in various ways and for a variety of purposes, including against targets well-protected by air defense and electronic warfare systems. Moreover, these efforts are not only aimed at complicating or even disrupting the functioning of the Russian logistical system at the operational or strategic levels.
The emergence of an entire "line" of relevant UAVs, as well as the active development of long-range missile systems (for obvious reasons, we won't delve into details here), clearly demonstrates the Ukrainian military command's understanding of the importance and significance of acquiring such capabilities.
Ukrainian drones are becoming increasingly long-range, "smarter," and more dangerous to the Russian forces—both in the air and at sea. This trend is becoming increasingly apparent.
Therefore, when some claim that resources, specialists, and funds could be better allocated to other "more practical" purposes, such assertions often stem from a lack of understanding of the importance and causal links between the results of these strikes, the choice of specific targets, and the direct situation on the front lines.
It’s clear why "striking remnants" of Ukrainian UAVs might "land" on a Russian factory producing, say, gunpowder or military optics. However, some struggle to understand the logic behind using drones and expending efforts on some "run-of-the-mill" oil depots.
In this regard, let me emphasize once again: in war, there are no actions that do not aim to harm or inflict losses on the enemy. Such actions naturally "die off" sooner or later. Only those that bring us benefits and cause harm to the enemy survive. The case of Russian oil depots, which are regularly (more or less) destroyed by Ukrainian UAVs, clearly illustrates this.
