I will briefly outline the likely scenario of an impending offensive by the Russian forces in the near future. It’s obvious to everyone that an attempt will be made. And, what's more, they won’t be counting the cost. The reason is not the situation on the front – in March, it is grim for the enemy. It’s not due to sudden reserves they found – they didn’t find anything suddenly. The reasons are purely political. But for Putin, they come first.
The Russian dictator sees the overall picture in pieces. He thinks that this specific episode of the war, on this scale, they won’t be able to handle in 2026. Therefore, in the fall, there will be serious negotiations, where he needs a trump card. The bunker ruler believes that in six months, his army can inflict serious damage on the Ukrainian Armed Forces, occupy large territories, and dictate terms. This is unrealistic, but he will demand results at any cost. However, before the fall, there will be a summer campaign, and there is another deadline here – May 9. The veterans fought, the Victory Parade, and mass celebrations. Tied to this sacred date, Putin will announce himself as a great commander and the victor of all the world. You can’t move this to the summer; a bright and clear result must be delivered within this month.
So, they’ve decided when. How – that’s clear too. There are certain reserves they’ve kept in the rear over the past few months. At least, someone from the Third Assault Brigade spoke about three such divisions, and I tend to believe combat experts rather than sofa analysts. They will find them. Does the Tsar need a victory? The Institute for the Study of War is already writing that they’ve amassed troops in the Lyman direction, achieving a tenfold advantage in manpower. This information fits logically into the overall picture, although I don’t fully believe in the figure of ten. The final question – where?
The most logical and promising option for them is the Lyman direction. Khortytsia operational-strategic group is already talking about the intensification of combat actions there. However, there are nuances. The Russian troops have had quite a hard time specifically from the Third Assault Brigade, losing some positions and now trying to regain them.
Occupation or just a real success in the Donetsk region as a victory by May 9 would be ideal. Especially since there is no need to storm a city the size of Zaporizhzhia or Kharkiv. But near Pokrovsk, the result is zero. They’re bogged down. Even a small success near Pokrovsk strategically gives nothing. Occupying Donbas means taking the "Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka-Kramatorsk-Slavyansk" agglomeration. The assault on Kostyantynivka hasn’t even started. They’re stuck at Toretsk and Chasiv Yar. And taking all these cities one by one from south to north – at the current pace, it will take about ten years.
A successful breakthrough in the Lyman direction and cutting off logistics along the "Kharkiv-Slavyansk" highway would be a very strong move. It’s not exactly a cauldron, but it’s a cauldron in terms of logistics. The only weak spot of this plan is that it’s too obvious. So, it won’t be sneaky and sudden. Nevertheless, it seems to me that a whole series of factors are aligning right now.
The May 9 Parade – it has to be done beautifully because next year there will be fewer reasons to celebrate. Negotiations in the fall – the Kremlin needs strong cards. Even partial occupation of the Donetsk region – this could be presented as a "beautiful result of the special military operation." So, it seems to me that the hardest and most real clash of 2025 awaits us in the Lyman direction in the near future.
