Here's a concise summary from multiple fronts:
Sumy Direction (North Slobozhanshchyna)
The enemy continues attempts to advance in the eastern part of its salient, moving generally from north to south, specifically:
- The forward units of the 11th and 83rd Separate Air Assault Brigades periodically attack along the directions Yablunyvka – Varachyne and Vodolahy – Varachyne, trying to push southward along the Snahost River. These attempts have been unsuccessful.
- Assault units of the enemy’s 76th Air Assault Division continue fierce fighting aiming to fully capture the village of Yunakiyivka and advance south towards the villages of Khrapivshchyna and Maryino. So far, without success.
- These same units, supported by detachments from the 106th Airborne Division and units of the 810th Separate Marine Brigade, are attempting to seize a large forested area north of the Sadky hamlet. These efforts remain largely ineffective so far.
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) in the western part of the enemy’s salient near the border of Sumy region are actively attacking along the directions Kindratievka – Konstantinivka and Andriivka – Zolotaryevskyi Nature Reserve.
Additionally, some advanced Ukrainian units are reportedly gradually pushing toward Oleksiivka from the southeast and trying to hold their positions in Novonikolayivka.
There is information that the Ukrainian forces have already managed to “gain a foothold” in Oleksiivka (although the enemy is trying to hold a couple of forest plantations south of it) and are present in Novonikolayivka.
In my view, considering the combat capability of the enemy’s units and subunits, which has diminished due to previous losses, the Ukrainian forces could reasonably reach the line Konstantinivka – Vladimirovka within the next week or two, significantly trimming the Russian salient in the border area of Sumy region.
Kupiansk Direction
The enemy’s 6th Combined Arms Army continues to increase its efforts north of Kupiansk from its bridgehead on the Oskil River. Apparently, besides units of its 68th Motorized Rifle Division, much of the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade from the enemy’s 1st Tank Army—redeployed to this direction in spring to early summer this year—is also involved.
The enemy’s clear goal is to break through from the north and northeast to the main supply route (MSR) that provides logistical support to the Ukrainian units operating around Kupiansk and eastward (at the bridgehead). Specifically, this is the R-07 highway: Kharkiv – Chuhuiv – Kupiansk.
That’s why the enemy persistently attacks along the Radkivka – Kovalevka and Radkivka – Myrne (Moskovka) directions, disregarding losses. The prospects are very tempting for them if they succeed. In effect, this would almost completely block the MSR for a significant part of our grouping defending both Kupiansk itself and holding a considerable bridgehead east of it beyond the Oskil.
At present, it appears the enemy has advanced from Radkivka BEYOND the R-79 road (Kupiansk – Dvurechna) and reached the "UkrAutoGaz" gas station on the northern outskirts of Kupiansk. Simultaneously, the enemy is fighting hard to hold Kondrashivka on the northern flank, where several of its assault units previously broke through.
In my opinion, if Ukrainian command fails soon to push the enemy’s forward units back from the Kondrashivka – Radkivka line northeastward, the prospects for holding Kupiansk and the bridgehead east of it will be no better—and possibly worse—than the prospects for holding Pokrovsk.
Lyman Direction
The pace of the enemy’s forward units advancing on their bridgehead along the Chornyi Zherebets River toward Lyman, as well as along the Oskil front (from the Pisky-Radkivske to Lozove line), where units of the enemy’s 20th Army (144th and 3rd Motorized Rifle Divisions), reinforced by part of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division from the 1st Tank Army, are operating, has significantly slowed down. Despite active attacks along the directions of Lypove – Karpivka, Novoe – Redkodub, and Zelenaya Dolyna – Shandryholove, the enemy’s forward units have yet to achieve any substantial results even tactically.
Except for several assault groups from the 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (part of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division), which managed to advance about 400 meters south of Karpivka toward the village of Srednye, these attacks have brought little success so far.
However, in the neighboring sector of the enemy’s 25th Army, operating south of the 20th Army, it appears the enemy has managed to consolidate in Torske and advance south of the Lyman – Kreminna road.
Assault units from the 67th Motorized Rifle Division of this army (likely the 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment and part of the 19th Tank Regiment) have evidently taken the northern and central parts of the village of Torske and pushed more than 2 km south of the road.
Thus, the situation for our units defending the Serebriansky Forestry has clearly and significantly worsened. The enemy is persistently pushing along the Chornyi Zherebets from north to south, attempting to get into their rear areas.
Given that to the south, across the Siverskyi Donets River, the enemy’s 3rd Army is also pushing strongly from east to west and is already fighting to take control of Hryhorivka, it is quite likely that soon they will either have to fully abandon this area and retreat behind the Chornyi Zherebets River, or try to hold it while defending with “turned-out” flanks (although the presence of the full-flowing Siverskyi Donets on one flank somewhat eases these prospects for them).
Siversk (Slovyansk) Direction
The enemy continues a slow, creeping advance toward Siversk with forces from their 3rd Army. Its forward units are actively attacking along several directions: Hryhorivka – Serebrianka, Verkhnekamenske – Siversk, Ivano-Dariivka – Vyimka, and Berestove – Vyimka.
Assault units from the enemy’s 6th, 127th, and 123rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades are operating here. In recent days, they have not achieved significant success. However, earlier the 127th Brigade’s units managed to break into Hryhorivka, and the 123rd Brigade’s units appear to have advanced about 1 km between Verkhnekamenske and Ivano-Dariivka, along the northern bank of the Sukha Plotva River.
Additionally, the enemy apparently attempted attacks along the Rozdolivka – Pereizne and toward Vyimka along the railway line, but without success.
Currently, in my view, the two most problematic sectors for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in this direction are:
- The coastal sector (axis Belohorivka – Hryhorivka – Serebrianka), where the enemy’s advance has not been fully stopped yet.
- The so-called “central” sector, namely Verkhnekamenske – Siversk, where the command of the 3rd Army clearly concentrates its main efforts.
Judging by the situation, despite all efforts, the command of the 3rd Army has so far failed to bring its forward units to the eastern outskirts of Siversk city. Moreover, progress in the coastal sector is also difficult. Large open areas of terrain clearly do not favor the enemy’s offensive actions with significant infantry numbers.
Kramatorsk, Toretsk Directions
I don’t know what exactly they report to the supreme leader, but the city of Chasiv Yar is not fully controlled by Russian forces, despite his recent claims.
Yes, the enemy’s forward units from the 331st Parachute Regiment (part of the 98th Airborne Division) made some advances inside the city — they reached the Dnipro pond and took part of the city center. But the neighborhoods “Shevchenko,” “Shop No. 2,” and “Yuzhny” are NOT controlled by Russian troops. Moreover, they are forced to fight stubbornly to hold the “Novoseverny” microdistrict, which they also do not fully control. So what “full capture” of Chasiv Yar is this leader talking about?
Enemy attacks “across the canal” (meaning the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas Canal north of the city), along the Hryhorivka – Markove direction, are also so far unsuccessful.
Apparently, the transfer of part of the sector of the 51st Army to the 3rd Army (up to the outskirts of Toretsk), with the 51st Army moving to the Pokrovsk direction, has not been beneficial for the 3rd Army, despite the fact that it now apparently includes the entire 3rd Army Corps.
Thus, the breakthrough of Russian forces to Konstantynivka and Druzhkivka from the northeast — i.e., “through Chasiv Yar and its surroundings,” which was clearly part of the whole “Konstantynivka operation” plan — is dragging on.
As I understand it, this was a matter of priority… or rather, a choice between Pokrovsk and Konstantynivka. The Russian command apparently decided that the 8th Army could break through to Konstantynivka on its own (from the southwest and southeast, i.e., from Toretsk and the salient north of Vozdvyzhenka). This decision was based on the fact that the 8th Army includes two fully staffed motorized rifle divisions — the 20th and 150th — and it was reinforced with a couple of remaining brigades from the 51st Army, along with their “mobilization” regiments and battalions.
However, after a month of stubborn and bloody fighting (with participation from the 51st Army units and the 3rd Army Corps of the 3rd Army), operating from the Toretsk direction and the Novooleksiyivka–Romanivka line, the 8th Army managed to reach only Yablunivka and create several small tactical penetrations northwest and north of Toretsk, toward Shcherbynivka and Bila Hora (through both Deliivkas).
In other words, this regrouping of forces and resources between the two troop groups “Center” and “South” was aimed at concentrating as many forces as possible (especially manpower replenishment) on the Pokrovsk direction.
It turns out that as soon as the 51st Army left the Toretsk direction to “storm Pokrovsk,” the 8th Army, which was acting jointly with it, began to slow down. Adding part of the 3rd Army Corps to it (as compensation, presumably) didn’t help much. So far, they have been unable to take Shcherbynivka and Pleshcheivka — without which it will be very difficult for the enemy to break through to Konstantynivka.
