After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the main center of Russian intelligence operations in the Middle East shifted from Syria to Iran. Strengthening ties between Moscow and Tehran became especially evident in 2022, when the number of flights by Russian intelligence operatives to Iran sharply increased, according to The Insider.
Russia and Iran had long-standing relations, but Moscow previously avoided publicizing them to maintain good ties with Israel. However, after launching its full-scale war against Ukraine, Russia faced arms shortages and sanctions, making Iran a strategic partner. In July 2022, Vladimir Putin visited Tehran—his first visit outside the post-Soviet space since the war began. Following this, Russian intelligence activities in Iran surged, with high-ranking officials from the GRU, FSB, and SVR arriving in the country.
A key event was the October 1, 2022, visit of a delegation led by GRU Deputy Chief General Sergey Afanasyev. Before this, he had not been known to visit Iran, but after this date, he traveled there regularly. He was accompanied by General Andrey Averyanov, known for Novichok poisonings in the UK and Europe and for organizing explosions at military warehouses in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. The third participant was a former GRU station chief in Dushanbe, traveling under the alias Alexey Sorokin.
Details of their talks remain unknown, but shortly after, a delegation from Tatarstan visited a secret drone assembly plant in Iran. Hackers from PRANA Network, linked to the Iranian opposition, accessed correspondence between the Iranian company Sahara Thunder and Russian recipients from Tatarstan. The negotiations resulted in an agreement to train Russian specialists in Iran and supply components for drone production in Tatarstan. To conceal the cooperation, drones were labeled as "boats," and Iran was referred to as "Belarus."
The deal involved the company Alabuga Machinery, led by CEO Nikolai Aftapov. On the Iranian side, the contract was signed by Hossein Bakhshayesh, who had been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury for arms transfers. Part of the payments was reportedly made in gold bars, as confirmed by leaked correspondence.
Drone deliveries to Russia were conducted via the Caspian Sea, leading to EU sanctions in November 2024 against Russian shipping companies involved in transporting Iranian drones and missiles. Previously, these companies primarily transported cars, aviation parts, and food, but after engaging in military cooperation with Iran, their revenues surged by 75–80%.
Russian-Iranian intelligence cooperation continues to expand. Frequent visitors to Iran now include not only GRU leaders but also SVR chief Sergey Naryshkin, former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, and FSB operatives.
The GRU’s Tehran station is headed by Colonel Igor Dyomkin, who operates under diplomatic cover as an embassy advisor. He trained at the GRU Military-Diplomatic Academy, and his family is registered in a Moscow dormitory for intelligence officers. Reports indicate he frequently visits Iran’s Hamadan Air Base and the Amirabad port, from where drones and Fateh missiles are shipped to Russia.
Dyomkin oversees several GRU officers, including Colonels Dmitry Kuvshinov and Yevgeny Belokonev. Also advising Iran is Lieutenant Colonel Yuliy Deryabin, an air defense specialist helping Tehran enhance its missile defense systems—though recent successful Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets raise questions about his effectiveness.
Russian intelligence ties with Iranian business structures are also evident in the activities of Vladimir Obydenov and Vyacheslav Yuvachev, representatives of Russia’s Chamber of Commerce in Iran. Both are former military personnel—Obydenov served in the GRU, while Yuvachev is a graduate of a missile forces military academy. They have connections to Mir Business Bank, which helped finance drone deliveries.
Thus, Iran has become Russia’s key military-technical partner, transforming into the primary hub for Russian espionage in the Middle East.
