By Viktor Andrusiv

"Today, Putin's initiative is evident on all fronts, so the Korean scenario may only become real after the collapse of his plans. At present, he faces a crossroads with two approaches.

1. Continuing the creeping occupation that has been ongoing. Despite colossal losses over the past six months, the largest since the invasion began, especially in equipment, some results have been achieved. The progress is minimal, but it exists. Avdiivka came at a high cost but was taken. Previously, I wrote about Putin's new meat strategy, and he clearly considers its implementation.

However, it's not just conditional successes on the front lines that sway Putin towards this approach. Firstly, the Russian General Staff genuinely believes that Ukrainian Armed Forces are on the brink. They expect a long-awaited "front collapse" to happen soon. Their reasoning has its arguments: problems with mobilization, issues with ammunition supply, problems with American assistance, internal political issues.. Therefore, their logic is to continue holding the pace of their cannon fodder assaults for as long as possible. The only drawback of this approach is that it doesn't allow for the realization of the second approach.

2. A new major offensive towards a hypothetical Kharkiv. Although Putin and his cannon fodder generals never feel the limits of their capabilities, the laws of physics do limit them. Therefore, continuously conducting assaults and preparing for a 200 km advance is clearly beyond their capabilities. It's either one or the other.

The second approach has its advantages. Firstly, a massive new offensive serves as significant evidence that Putin is winning and that the entire West's strategy to help Ukraine has failed. This is especially potent just before the American elections. And not just American, as this is the biggest election year in history. Secondly, capturing a major city, the "first capital," signifies military success and rehabilitation after the shameful failure of the invasion. Putin is an emotional creature, albeit with cold calculation; getting even is important for him, as it is for his herd. Thirdly, an offensive on Kharkiv postpones the possibility of bombing Belgorod with MLRS.

Recent signals indicate that the occupiers are leaning towards the first approach. The Russian operational reserve has been sent to the front lines, and more and more poorly-prepared occupiers are being encountered. However, it's still too early to judge.

Regardless of which approach Putin chooses, by November-December, his military forces will be exhausted and forced to switch to defense. I don't see prospects for major successes in his campaign yet, perhaps a few more "Avdiivkas," but not many more. If there isn't something extraordinary from our side. But the result of this campaign will be that we will also be extremely exhausted. And it's highly doubtful that either side will have the opportunity to build up strength for a new powerful counteroffensive.

This is how the Korean scenario unfolded. After colossal losses on both sides and endless counteroffensives, during which Seoul changed hands four times, the war lost its sense in terms of continuation. There was an important factor, the death of Stalin, but there were almost no significant changes on the front lines in the last year of the war. Everyone was exhausted, there was no winner, and no one wanted to escalate to a nuclear war. According to various estimates, between 2 and 4 million people were lost on both sides, including civilians.

An important detail is that a peace treaty has not been signed to this day, and a ceasefire was not signed on behalf of South Korea, nor did anyone from the UN forces sign it. General Mark W. Clark signed it. It's a very similar prospect for us, as hardly any politician will allow themselves to sign a ceasefire with Putin.

Next, we'll discuss the chances and possibilities to avoid the Korean scenario, although they already look like fantasy."