By Vladislav Inozemtsev Specifically for "Kremlyovsky Bezzbashennik"
Despite the optimistic statements coming from negotiation platforms, there is no doubt that the approaches to securing peace in Ukraine in the U.S. and Europe differ significantly. Americans assume (not without reason) that any agreement will likely be made largely on Putin’s terms. Europeans accuse Washington of “appeasing” Moscow (which is not far from the truth either). I will not delve into which solution would be ideal (all options claiming that status are essentially unfeasible) but will comment on the European position.
Criticism of Washington from the EU would be much more convincing if there hadn’t been just another “change of frontman” regarding Russia in recent years. In the early 2000s, Moscow, as is well known, had a friendly relationship with the U.S. based on hopes of joint counterterrorism efforts. Later, it aligned with Europe in opposition to the American intervention in Iraq. At that time, Russia was, overall, a “normal country”: peaceful, democratic, and focused on economic development.
However, in 2008 Russia attacked Georgia and then recognized the independence of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. How did Europe respond? French President N. Sarkozy shuttled between Moscow and Tbilisi, trying to reconcile the parties. Did Russia fulfill the main points of the agreement with pomp? No. In 2014–2015, Crimea was annexed and the war in Donbas began, in which Moscow openly supported the separatists. What did the Europeans do? They enthusiastically promoted the Normandy format, the Minsk agreements, and the Steinmeier plan. Did these become the basis for peace? No. In late 2021–early 2022, who was constantly traveling to Moscow? Certainly not the Americans. Did these negotiations prevent conflict? Again, no.
Can it be said that Europeans were outraged by Russia’s aggressive behavior? Perhaps deep down they condemned it. But at the same time, from 2008 to 2021, EU countries imported more than €2.19 trillion worth of goods from Russia, and by early 2022, their cumulative direct investments in Russia exceeded €255 billion. The United States lagged far behind: during the same period, they purchased $294 billion in Russian goods, and their investments in Russia did not exceed $12.3 billion. Moreover, European, not American, banks financed Russian companies, and European, not American, goods filled the domestic consumer market. Since the start of Russia’s so-called special military operation in Ukraine, the U.S. has provided at least $131 billion in support to Kyiv (44% of imports from Russia over the previous 15 years), while EU countries and the EU as a whole provided around $173 billion (6.4% of imports from Russia over the same period). In other words, Americans almost certainly spent far more on countering Russia than they ever earned from cooperating with it, whereas Europeans only shared a portion of the profits—and today do everything to avoid further investment, compensating only part of their past involvement from confiscated Russian assets.
In short, before accusing Washington of appeasing Russia and seeking profitable deals with Putin, Europeans would do well to take stock of their long-term business with Moscow—a business that likely prevented the EU from taking a principled position toward the Kremlin years ago, the absence of which now allows them to theatrically blame the American administration.
